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CONVENTIONS AND CONVICTIONS: A VALUATIVE THEORY
OF PUNISHMENT
Daniel Maggen*
Abstract
The one thing that most scholars of criminal law agree upon is that
we are in desperate need of a comprehensive theory of punishment. The
theory that comes closest to meeting this demand is the expressive account
of punishment, yet it is often criticized for its inability to explain how the
expression of communal values justifies punishment and why the
condemnation of wrongdoing necessarily requires punishment. The
Article answers these criticisms by arguing against the need to necessarily
connect punishment to wrongdoing and by developing expressivism into a
novel theory of punishment, grounded in the valuative function punishment
serves.
Offering an original interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of
Judgment, the Article argues that criminal law should be understood as a
device in the service of the individual’s interest in affirming her
personhood, an interest that is promoted by the creation and
communication of values. The Article posits that criminal law serves this
purpose by safeguarding the conditions that facilitate valuative
communication. It does so by (1) cataloging the values shared in the
community; (2) outlining the ways in which these values are commonly
interpreted; and (3) penalty responding to forms of behavior that hinder
successful valuation.
The Article concludes by examining the prohibition of abortion in
light of the values such prohibition purports to protect, distinguishing
between prohibitions that legitimately support the function of valuation
and those prohibitions that serve communal values irrespective of the
important function of valuation. The Article contends that, even if under
certain circumstances an affront to protected values could justify the
prohibition of abortion, the reasons for prohibition will commonly fail to
justify the penal condemnation of those who perform or undergo it.
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INTRODUCTION
During a town hall meeting held in Green Bay on May 2016, Donald Trump,
then a contender in the Republican presidential primaries, made a statement that was
met with considerable astonishment. Pressed by moderator Chris Matthews, Mr.
Trump conceded that if abortion was outlawed, something that he would presumably
seek to do as President, then women illegally undergoing abortion would be subject
to punishment. This statement provoked immediate rebuke from Democrats and
Republicans alike, quickly prompting Mr. Trump to backtrack on its penal
conclusion.1
Why did the move from the criminalization of abortion—hardly surprising for
a self-proclaimed “pro-life” candidate—to its punishment draw such ire? Much of
the answer no doubt involves election dynamics and the profound moral,
philosophical, and political questions that surround the topic of abortion. This
Article will, however, argue that an essential aspect of the answer also concerns the
ambiguous connection between punishment and crime, as well as their connection
to the values they purport to serve.2
These connections were traditionally addressed by the retributive and
deterrence-based justifications of punishment, yet neither has proved capable of
comprehensively explicating them. As a result, a relatively new expressive theory of
punishment has been put forward by various authors as an alternative understanding
of punishment, to succeed where the traditional accounts have failed.3 The
expressive account, which is particularly attractive to those attempting to make sense
of the criminalization of abortion, suggests that punishment is justified as a way of

1
See Matt Flegenheimer & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump, Abortion Foe, Eyes
‘Punishment’ for Women, Then Recants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016, at A1.
2
Contemporary scholarship is almost unanimous in lamenting this ambiguity. See, e.g.,
DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME PREVENTION,
AND THE LAW (2005) (generally arguing against the ability to theoretically justify
punishment); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Justifying Punishment, 14 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 161, 162
(2001) (generally arguing for the impossibility of a coherent general justification of
punishment); Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 42, 42
(1979) (noting the gap between the pervasiveness of punishment and the unavailability of a
clear justification of punishment); J. L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 3 (1982) (noting the paradoxical gap between the unavailability of a
clear justification of punishment and its familiarity from the perspective of retributivism);
Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 273, 276 (1982) (arguing that there is today no satisfactory theory of punishment).
3
The most significant authors to write in the expressive tradition include Antony Duff,
Joel Feinberg, Jean Hampton, and Dan Kahan. See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS
233–36 (Sydney Shoemaker et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter DUFF, TRIALS AND
PUNISHMENTS]; Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400
(1965); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
208, 217 (1984); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 597 (1996).
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conveying the social reprobation of actions that flout shared social values.4
Expressivism, however, is widely criticized on two main points. First, it is often
argued that expressivism suffers from what is known as the problem of hard
treatment.5 A theory of punishment, according to this objection, must be able to
explain punishment qua hard treatment, meaning the intentional infliction of
suffering on the punishee. While expressivism can, perhaps, explain the purpose of
punishment, it is argued that it fails to explain why such condemnation needs to take
the form of hard treatment.6 This failure, it is argued, prevents expressivism from
being regarded as a meaningful justification of punishment.7
This Article will respond to this criticism by distinguishing between two modes
of justifying punishment, based on the kind of prima facie wrong that punishment is
thought to exhibit. Punishment, on one view, is not inherently different from other
state actions, and the kind of justification it entails essentially requires grounding
punishment in the kind of good that is generally promoted by the legal order.8
Referring to this stance as the general approach to the justification of punishment,
the Article will suggest that it is characteristic of justifications of punishment as
diverse as Bentham’s utilitarianism and Kantian contractualism. On another view,
to which I will refer as the special mode of justification, punishment represents a
unique evil, surpassing the general wickedness of non-penal state action, and is
therefore in need of a special form of justification, which ostensibly can only be
found in its connection to another unique evil, that of crime.9 It is not enough, on
this account, that punishment could be shown to be in the service of a generally
desirable moral purpose; instead, the only purpose that might absolve punishment
of its sins can be found in its inversion of crime, in backward-looking retribution or
forward-looking crime prevention.
The objection to expressivism for its failure to adequately address the problem
of hard treatment comes from the direction of the special mode of justification, yet
this Article will argue that there is no reason to heed the demands that expressivism
adheres to the underlying premises of the special approach. After shedding light on
some of the weaknesses of the special approach, this Article will suggest that
expressivism is better understood as a general justification of punishment, rejecting
the idea that there is something particularly evil about punishment that cannot be
justified by reasons that would be equally applicable to other state actions.
This understanding of the expressive account puts the onus of justification on
the beneficial purpose ostensibly served by criminal law, and here it is where
4

See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400; Kahan, supra note 3, at 596.
See generally Ambrose Y.K. Lee, Defending a Communicative Theory of Punishment:
The Relationship Between Hard Treatment and Amends, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 217
(2017) (surveying the difficulty expressive theories have in justifying hard treatment).
6
See, e.g., Linda Ross Meyer, Herbert Morris and Punishment, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
109, 118 (2003).
7
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1421–22 (2000).
8
See infra Section I.A.1.
9
See infra Section I.A.2.
5
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expressivism encounters a second, more formidable objection. On the expressive
account, punishment, and criminal law in general, are justified as a way of
expressing social values. As some of the proponents of expressivism themselves
admit, this purpose seems to put the expressive justification at odds with the
fundamental tenets of liberalism, as it seems to transform the individual into an
instrument for social progress, or, at least, make the moral stature of the individual
overly dependent on the community she is part of.10
After surveying some of the ways in which different proponents of
expressivism seek to overcome this challenge, and how their failure to do so is
affected by the unnecessary attempt to resolve the hard treatment problem, this
Article will suggest that the expressive justification can be redeemed by viewing the
promotion of social values as but one aspect of the more fundamental purpose of
promoting individual valuation, in which social values are used to promote
individual assertions of agency.
Individuals, it will be suggested, assign value to objects as a way of asserting
their creative agency and personhood. To validate these valuative self-assurances,
individuals seek to communicate their values to others, whom they believe would
accept these values in recognition of the agency of their creators. Social values, in
this view, deserve legal protection not because of their intrinsic worth but rather
because of their ability to contribute to the self-asserting efforts of individuals.
Accordingly, when we come to scrutinize the legal promotion of social values, in
general, or in criminal law, we must do so with an eye to the more fundamental
purpose of promoting individual valuation.
Once the shift from values to valuation is incorporated into the expressive
theory, we can distinguish between two main ways in which criminal law promotes
the purpose of valuation, doing so either directly or indirectly. Beginning with the
latter, this Article will argue that criminal law can be understood as part of a general
endeavor to facilitate the necessary conditions for the successful creation and
communication of values.11 Criminal law does this, this Article will suggest, by
giving voice to the values shared by members of the community, describing the ways
in which the scope of these values is commonly understood, and prohibiting the
creation of conditions that hinder their communication. This indirect mode of
operation, this Article argues, is most characteristic of the protection of those aspects
of valuation that are further from the core of self-assurance, as they are generally
less significant for the very ability to assert one’s personhood.
10

See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3, at 597.
There is some resemblance between this direction and Jürgen Habermas’
communicative theory. Habermas, however, views communication in dialectical terms,
mediating between the individual and the community, while I see it as an immediate
instrument of self-assertion. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS
157 (Jeremy L. Shapiro trans., Heinemann Educ. Books, 2d. ed. 1978) (1968) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 65–66 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber
Nicholsen trans., Mass. Inst. Tech. 1990) (1983); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 17–19 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981).
11
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This Article will then proceed to argue that in addition to the general purpose
of safeguarding social values, criminal law at times responds more directly to forms
of behavior that negatively affect the valuative efforts of others. Here, this Article
will suggest that rejecting the ability of others to form communicable values, by
treating them as inferior, imposing on them judgments that are divorced from their
self-asserting valuation, or treating them as objects, can have a direct disruptive
effect on the ability of those thus treated to continue using valuation for the purpose
of self-assertion. In responding to such forms of behavior with penal condemnation,
criminal law expresses the falsity of such behavior and reassures the victim, and all
members of the community, that their values can be validated through
communication, despite the contrary message implicit in wrongdoer’s actions.
The argument will proceed in several steps. Part I will situate the expressive
account, and the problem of hard treatment from which it allegedly suffers, within
the scholarly debate on the justification of punishment. In doing so, Part I will
respond to the hard treatment objection by distinguishing between general and
special forms of justification. Part I will subsequently argue that the demand for
special justification places an unnecessary burden on the justification of punishment,
and that heeding this demand risks leading the practice of punishment down a
dangerous path. Part II will then explore the difficulty with the expressivist claim
that punishment is meant to promote social values. Part II will survey three ways in
which expressive theories attempt, and fail, to justify punishment in terms of its
contribution to the promotion of values, using utilitarian,12 Kantian,13 and Hegelian14
justificatory frameworks. Part III will respond to the problem of promoting values
by introducing a shift from values to valuation. Offering an innovative reading of
Immanuel Kant’s theory of judgment, this Part will explore the logic of
communicative valuation and how it can be thought of as assisting the affirmation
of personhood. Returning to the subject of punishment, Part IV will explore the ways
in which criminal law could be explained and justified as an instrument for the
promotion of valuation. This Part will argue that criminal law serves three main
functions that facilitate valuative communication: the enumeration of values shared
by members of the community; the specification of common interpretations for
various forms of behavior with regard to the affirmation or denial of valuation; and
the reaffirmation of values and valuation in the face of criminal behavior that flouts
them. This Part will further distinguish between the direct and indirect ways in which
criminal law promotes valuation, either by focusing on the disruption of valuation
itself or on the erosion of social values.
Finally, Part V of this Article will explore the possible criminalization of
abortion, as it is presented in the Supreme Court’s opinion in the case of Roe v.
Wade15 as a case of indirect legal protection of individual valuation. Viewed from
this perspective, this Article will argue that the social values that commonly inform
12

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
14
See infra Section II.C.
15
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13
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the prohibition of abortion can be justified in doing so only as far as they are in the
service of individual valuation. In addition, this Article will argue that even when
the prohibition of abortion is justifiable in these terms, the penal condemnation of
the women who undergo it may not be, given the distinct functions served by
criminalization and condemnation.
I. EXPRESSIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF HARD TREATMENT
A. The Problem of Hard Treatment
Up until recently, the attempts to justify the practice of punishment could be
generally divided between those made by utilitarians, who believe that punishment
is justified as a form of crime prevention, and retributivists, who insist that
punishment is justified by virtue of being a just response to past wrongdoing.16
Endless debate between these two opposing schools has led to the point of mutual
destruction, as both views develop devastating critiques of each other.17
In response to the failure of these traditional justifications, several influential
scholars of criminal law have begone over the past few decades to develop an
alternative expressive justification of punishment.18 As their name suggests,
expressive theories maintain that punishment must be understood and justified as a
communicative act.19 Joel Feinberg influentially set the tone for this approach by
describing punishment as “a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either
on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the
punishment is inflicted.”20 The fact that punishment expresses condemnation seems
intuitively true, almost to the degree of truism, but can this insight justify
punishment?21
The family of approaches that took Feinberg’s lead has mainly focused on
punishment’s expressivity to answer this question;22 however, I believe that it would
be more useful to address it by stressing punishment’s conventionality. In one sense
16

See, e.g., J.P. Day, Retributive Punishment, 87 MIND 498, 498 (1978).
See, e.g., George Kateb, Punishment and the Spirit of Democracy, 74 SOC. RES. 269,
269 (2007).
18
This idea dates back to the work of Émile Durkheim. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL
EDUCATION: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION
176–178 (Everett K. Wilson ed. & trans., Herman Schnurer trans., The Free Press of Glencoe
1961) (1925).
19
See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 3.
20
Id.
21
Some indeed argue that its intuitive appeal is in fact nothing more than a form of
unhelpful truism that fails to take us beyond the arguments made by the traditional
justifications. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Punishment as Language: Misleading Analogy for
Desert Theorists, 10 LAW & PHIL. 311, 319 (1991); A. J. Skillen, How to Say Things with
Walls, 55 PHILOSOPHY 509, 511 (1980).
22
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1375.
17
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of the word, the one most clearly used by Feinberg in the above passage,
punishment’s conventionality concerns the medium of punishment.23 Against the
tendency of the traditional justifications to take as their point of departure the
familiar image of punishment as an act meant to inflict unwelcome “hard treatment”
on the punishee,24 Feinberg suggests that this external expression of punishment is
incidental to its more fundamental essence, which could be expressed through
various conventional vehicles of punishment.25 I will explore the second meaning of
punishment’s conventionality in Part II, after first exploring the main objection
aimed at the first use of this notion.
According to one influential line of argument, Feinberg’s appeal to the
conventionality of the penal medium understates the centrality of hard treatment for
punishment.26 On this view, punishment differs from other forms of expression and
other actions in general in that it intends to cause suffering.27 Accordingly, leaving
this fact out of the justification of punishment, or making it merely a matter of
convention reflects, on this view, failure to justify punishment.28 While a
condemnatory message could be conveyed through the infliction of suffering, this
purpose could also be served in ways that do not include the infliction of suffering,
making it superfluous.29 Given the moral depravity of the infliction of suffering, this
objection continues, the fact that expressivism is willing to impose superfluous
suffering makes it morally objectionable.30
In responding to this objection, it is important to situate it within two distinct
modes of understanding the task of justification. According to one mode of
justification, the fact that the phenomenon of punishment commonly involves the
intentional infliction of pain is a consideration to be addressed within the internal
calculus of punishment: in certain instances, the suffering punishment causes would
render punishment unjust, while at other times the suffering could be outweighed by
the benefits punishment involves. Below, I will regard this view as the general
23

See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400.
See, e.g., J.R. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 124–27 (1980).
25
See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 402.
26
See, e.g., Nathan Hanna, Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism, 27 LAW
& PHIL. 123, 134 (2008) (“Punishment, after all, treats people in ways that are wrong under
most circumstances. Just because we can express certain things with punishment does not
mean that doing so is justified, especially if adequate alternative means of expression are
available”); Meyer, supra note 6, at 118 (“If there is not a necessary correlation between the
offender’s suffering and the victim’s social reaffirmation, then why punish?”).
27
For discussion of this idea, see Bill Wringe, Must Punishment Be Intended to Cause
Suffering?, 16 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 863, 866 (2013).
28
See, e.g., MATT MATRAVERS, JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT: THE RATIONALE OF
COERCION 79 (2000).
29
See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 40 (1996) [hereinafter Duff, Penal Communications].
30
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 5, at 220 (“If formal convictions or purely symbolic
punishments can communicate the censure that offenders deserve for their crimes, there
would be no good reasons to communicate it by way of hard treatment. Doing so would
simply be wrong.”).
24
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approach to justification. In contrast, another view suggests that the fact that
punishment involves the intentional infliction of suffering makes it a uniquely
wicked phenomenon, in need of special justification. On this account, evident in the
hard treatment objection, the unique evil of punishment entails that any attempt to
defend it must be equally exceptional in its justificatory framework.31 This form of
justification, it is often suggested, could only derive from punishment’s inverse
connection to the crime.32
Below I will defend the first, general mode of justification, asking whether the
moral benefit provided by punishment is justified despite the use of hard treatment.
The alternative special approach, I will suggest, is but one understanding of the kind
of justification that is required of punishment; even if it is not inherently misguided,
it certainly places an undue and dangerous burden on the practice of punishment.
Preferring the general to the special mode of justification, I will conclude, obviates
the need to respond to the hard treatment objection, as it is premised on the belief
that the justification of punishment must be uniquely tied to the crime.
B. Justifying Punishment
Justification means different things under different theories of punishment. As
Mitchell Berman suggests, of the idea of justification, conceptually assumes that
there is some prima facie cause for concern about punishment—a reason for which
it stands in need of justification.33 Different theories of punishment, he suggests,
differ on how they seek to go beyond this initial “demand basis.”34 Berman
accordingly believes that we can distinguish between penal theories that seek to
demonstrate that there are considerations that override the prima facie wrongness of
punishment and theories that deal with it by arguing that, upon reflection, the act of
punishment does not give rise to the demand basis in question.35 David Dolinko
suggests another helpful distinction between theories that practice rational
justification by articulating the logic of punishment and theories that purport to offer
a moral justification of punishment by explaining why it is morally permissible or

31
32

See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 6, at 118.
See, e.g., John Tasioulas, Punishment and Repentance, 81 PHILOSOPHY 279, 296

(2006).
33

See Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 265 (2008).
Id.
35
Berman correctly adds that defeating the demand basis does not necessarily entail
that the action is justified for all intents and purposes, only that “it imposes no further
obligation” on its proponent. Id. “This,” he suggests, “is not to say that the practice is thereby
rendered justified, or even justifiable, all things considered. Maybe it is, maybe not. The
more modest (yet significant) upshot is only that the practice no longer stands,
embarrassedly, ‘in need of justification.’” Id. David Dolinko likewise notes the limited
justificatory force of this form of justification. See David Dolinko, Retributivism,
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 521
(1997) [hereinafter Dolinko, Retributivism].
34
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desirable to engage in punishment.36 A third distinction is inspired by H.L.A. Hart’s
suggestion that we can differentiate between the distribution of punishment and its
imposition.37
Another distinction I wish to pursue in this Section, related to the previous
three, is one between general and special modes of justification. I will suggest that
for those theories that take the general approach to justification, the demand basis of
punishment is no different from the one raised by state action in general, at least not
categorically so.38 Viewed from this perspective, the justification of punishment
primarily requires elucidating the beneficial purpose that punishment purportedly
promotes and explaining why this purpose overrides or erases the initial ground for
objection.
In contrast to the general theories, and often in response to their shortcomings,
various special modes of justification seek to narrow the scope of inquiry from state
action in general to the justification of punishment.39 For these theories, punishment
involves a unique evil, mirroring the evil of criminal wrongdoing.40 It is not enough,
on these views, to show that punishment is beneficial; instead, the unique evils of
punishment can only be atoned by an equally unique benefit, derived from its
response to crime.41
1. General Justification
One of the clearest examples for the general approach to the justification of
punishment comes from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, particularly when it is
contrasted with J.S. Mill’s utilitarian approach to punishment. For Bentham, the
justification of punishment is mostly subsumed under the general justificatory

36

David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 539 (1991).
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 8–9 (2nd ed. 2008).
38
See Section I.B.1.
39
See Section I.B.2.
40
See, e.g., R.A. Duff & D. Garland, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in A
READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 2–3 (R.A. Duff & D. Garland eds., 1994) (“[Punishment] is
morally problematic because it involves doing things to people that (when not described as
punishment) seem morally wrong.”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Introduction, in PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION 1 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 3d ed. 1995) (“If locking human beings in cages
or killing them is not a bad way to treat people, it is hard to imagine what would be.”);
Christopher Ciocchetti, Wrongdoing and Relationships: An Expressive Justification of
Punishment, 29 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 65, 68 (2003) (arguing that the kind of justification
punishment requires derives from the fact that it essentially constitutes the same behavior
that criminal law proscribes); Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 310 (2004) (suggesting that punishment is in need
of justification because of its resemblance to wrongdoing).
41
“The deep intuition that a punishment should follow a crime, and should be limited
by the offender’s subjective malice,” Linda Ross Meyer thus observes, “is a grounding
principle of both criminal law and everyday morality.” Meyer, supra note 6, at 109.
37
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framework of the state.42 Punishment, for Bentham, is primarily an expression of
governance, in need of justification because of its interference with the choices and
preferences of those subject to it.43 Hence, if punishment qua state action is to be
justified, such imposition must show itself to be motivated by objectively valid
considerations.44 “The immediate principle end of punishment,” Bentham writes, “is
to control action”;45 accordingly, “[t]he business of government is to promote the
happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.”46 Notwithstanding all other
considerations, punishment, like all state action, is justified according to Bentham
when properly guided by the general principle of utility.
Bentham, of course, also recognizes that punishment is distinct from rewards
in that it seeks to control action through the production of suffering.47 “All
punishment is mischief,” Bentham writes, “all punishment in itself is evil.”48
However, despite its added mischievousness, the justifiability of punishment, like
that of all state action, depends on its accordance with the general felicific calculus:
“[u]pon the principle of utility, if it ought be at all be admitted, it ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”49 To put it in other
words, because punishment’s justification as a means of control is contingent on its
conformity with the principle of utility, the fact that it produces suffering merely
implies that it can be justified only when and if this suffering is offset by other
pleasures it creates. Although, as Bentham notes, there are good reasons for which
punishment could only be justified in response to crime, there is nothing inherent in
the justification of punishment that makes this connection necessary.50
This aspect of the Benthamian justification of punishment is often seen as
grounds for objection, precisely for its inability to insist that it is inherently wrong
to apply punishment irrespective of crime.51 According to its critics, this form of
utilitarianism, we can call it general for our purposes, is faulted for its willingness
to take into account various considerations beyond the wrongdoer’s guilt, so that in
principle, there may very well be occasions in which the general utilitarian
recommends punishment even in the absence of guilt.52
42

See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 75 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996).
43
See id. at 287.
44
See id. at 18.
45
Id. at 164.
46
Id. at 74.
47
See id. at 158.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., Fredrich Rosen, Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the Innocent: The
Origins of a False Doctrine, 9 UTILITAS 23, 25 (1997).
51
See, e.g., Igor Primorac, Utilitarianism and Self-Sacrifice of the Innocent, 38
ANALYSIS 194, 195–96 (1978) (juxtaposing the utilitarian justification and the logic of the
Soviet show trials).
52
For these objections, see, for example, S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of
Punishment, 33 PHILOSOPHY 325, 331 (1958) (discussing the more categorical objections to
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Without taking full stock of this argument and the various ways in which
Benthamians respond to it, it should be noted that the “generality” of this account is
also a substantial factor weighing against disregarding culpability. As we recall,
punishment’s success on this account depends on the kind of fear it induces: ideally,
would-be wrongdoers’ fear of being subjected to hard treatment. The intentional
infliction of pain on the innocent—“telishment,” as John Rawls terms it—not only
needlessly amplifies the suffering caused by punishment by spreading it to those
who are not would-be criminals, but also diminishes the effectiveness of the threat
aimed at those who are.53 Of course, the adverse effects of telishment are contingent
on the public knowing that innocent people are being telished, but any utilitarian
contemplating it must contend with the inevitable possibility of the telishment
becoming publicly known.54 Given the wide variety of means of control at the
general utilitarian’s disposal, including punishments and rewards alike, it seems
highly unlikely that she would opt for the risky practice of telishment.55
Another important example of the difference between the general and the
special modes of justification is manifested by the difference between retributivism,
a form of justification often attributed to Immanuel Kant, and Kant’s actual views
on legal punishment.56 Kant today is often mentioned as one of the main protagonists
of retributivism, mainly because of several passing notes he has in which he
passionately promotes this view.57 Nevertheless, a more in-depth examination of
Kant’s writing makes it obvious that such notions cannot coexist with his more

the utilitarian justification); Igor Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 64 PHILOSOPHY 187,
187–88 (1989) (objecting to the utilitarian justification in general terms).
53
For Rawls’ description of this term, see John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL.
REV. 3, 11–12 (1955). For others who likewise answer this objection, see Guyora Binder &
Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J.
115, 133 (2000); William Lyons, Deterrent Theory and Punishment of the Innocent, 84
ETHICS 346–48 (1974); George Schedler, Can Retributivists Support Legal Punishment?, 63
MONIST 185, 186 (1980).
54
See, e.g., Pearl, supra note 2, at 280–86 (discussing the risk of telishment becoming
known).
55
Characterizing punishment as a means of control, however, exposes Benthamian
utilitarianism to a different, much more penetrating objection, for its dehumanization of its
citizenry, an objection often associated with Hegel. See Duff, Penal Communications, supra
note 29, at 13–14 (discussing the Hegelian objection).
56
For discussion of this discrepancy, see, for example, George P. Fletcher, The Nature
and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 695–97 (2000); Thomas E. Hill Jr.,
Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 LAW & PHIL. 407, 409 (1999); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 512–18 (1987).
57
See, e.g., Blumoff, supra note 2, at 168 (“All recent [retributive] theorists start with
Kant.”); M. Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, 6 LAW &
PHIL. 28, 39 (1987) (grounding the retributive argument in the kind of respect persons are
due); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME &
JUST. 55, 59–61 (1992) (identifying retributivism with Kant).
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overarching transcendental treatment of autonomy and human dignity.58 Instead, the
question of legal punishment is appended by Kant to the more general puzzles of
political dominion.59
For Kant, the justification of political authority rests on two arguments. First,
given the metaphysical nature of human freedom, Kant believes that no state action
(or any physical action for that matter) can negatively or positively affect an
individual’s autonomy.60 As a result, what political control requires is not
justification but rational reasons.61 From here, Kant continues to argue that a wellordered legal system, as a whole, promotes legal freedom by making it more
58

See, e.g., ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
PENAL JUSTICE 42–45 (2009) (arguing that Kantian formalism cannot positively justify
punishment); Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Principle of Justice as Categorical Imperative of Law,
in KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY RECONSIDERED 149, 153 (Yirmiyahu Yovel ed., 1989)
(noting that Kantian freedom cannot be protected by law); Peter Benson, External Freedom
According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 576 (1987) (discussing the difficulties that result
from the gap between Kant’s moral theory and his legal theory); Hill, supra note 56, at 409
(noting that Kant’s thesis concerns “our liability to suffer in the recognition of our own
misdeeds, not our right or duty to make others suffer for theirs.”); Marcus Willaschek, Why
the Doctrine of Right Does Not Belong in the Metaphysics of Morals: On Some Basic
Distinctions in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, 5 JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND ETHIK 205, 208–11,
224 (1997) (discussing the gap between Kantian morality and law).
59
See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in
TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTROY 17
(Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006) [hereinafter Kant, What Is
Enlightenment]; Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 215, 224 (1987).
60
As Kant puts it at some point, even when one is stretched on the torturer’s wheel, she
does not lose one iota of her freedom—for if that were the case, it would render her less
worthy of respect:
No man can be pathologically compelled, because of freewill. Human choice is
arbirium liberum, in that it is not necessitated per stimulus; if a man, for example,
is forced to an action by numerous and cruel tortures, he still cannot be compelled
to do these things if he does not will it; he can, after all, withstand the torture. . . .
In a free being an action can be practically necessary, and that in a high degree,
which simply cannot be surpassed – and yet it does not contradict freedom.
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 59–60 (J.B. Schneewind ed., Peter Heath trans.,
1997). For more on this aspect of Kant’s conception of freedom, see Onora S. O’Neill,
Agency and Anthropology in Kant’s Groundwork, in KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
RECONSIDERED 63, 74 (Yirmiyahu Yovel ed., 1989); Henry E. Allison, The Concept of
Freedom in Kant’s “Semi-Critical” Ethics, 68 ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE
96, 105 (2009). In his legal writing the separation between the moral domain of freedom and
the legal domain is manifested in his assertion that legal norms create no moral obligation.
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 24–25 (Mary J. Gregor ed., 1996)
[hereinafter KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].
61
See, e.g., Kant, What Is Enlightenment, supra note 59, at 133.
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effectual.62 The combination of these two arguments eventually leads Kant to
develop an account of state authority that is remarkably similar to the Hobbesian
model of the social contract.63 According to this explanation, the law represents a
formal agreement about the rights of individuals, ensuring that they are secure from
the interference of others in their earthly endeavors.64 Punishment, in this view, is
justified in light of its contribution to this desirable state of affairs, underscoring the
legal rights that ensue from the social agreement.65
62

See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 60, at 92–93. For discussion
of Kant’s theory of law and punishment that are in line with his general conception of
freedom, see, for example, Murphy, supra note 56, at 516–18, 521; Igor Primorac, Is
Retributivism Analytic?, 56 PHILOSOPHY 203, 203–11 (1981); Mark Tunick, Is Kant a
Retributivist?, 17 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 60, 66–67 (1996). Likewise, for neo-Kantians such
as John Rawls, a theory of law is meant to outline the general political institutions of a “wellordered society,” and much less so to establish the “wrongness” of disorder or crime. See,
e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 33, 161 (1991) (admitting the general
Kantian’s difficulty with distinguishing tolerable from intolerable behavior); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 441, 472 (Expanded ed. 2005) (admitting that the meaning of a
denial of voluntariness is “disputed” and “cannot be fully discussed.”); Seyla Benhabib,
Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theatre of Discursive Communication, in LIBERALISM
AND THE MORAL LIFE 149 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (noting the limited ability of
general public reason approaches to delineate criminality); JOSEPH RAZ, The Politics of the
Rule of Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND
POLITICS 370, 373 (1994) (admitting that demarcating the protected scope of voluntariness
is a difficult problem while denying the need to address it); Onora O’Neill, Political
Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 106
PHIL. REV. 411, 422 (1997) (criticizing Rawls’ inability to deal with those who disagree with
the community’s values); John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1987) (viewing the subject matter of a conception of justice as working
out the “‘basic structure’ of modern constitutional democracy,” meaning “society’s main
political, social and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified scheme
of social cooperation.”); John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL.
515, 520 (1980) (explaining that the original position serves its role by “modeling the way
in which the citizens in a well-ordered society, viewed as moral persons, would ideally select
first principles of justice for their society.”).
63
See, e.g., Tom Sorell, Punishment in a Kantian Framework, in PUNISHMENT AND
POLITICAL THEORY 10, 22–23 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (discussing the Hobbesian
foundation of Kant’s theory of law).
64
See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 60, at 40–46; Robert B. Pippin,
Mine and Thine? The Kantian State, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT AND MODERN
PHILOSOPHY 416, 416–20 (Paul Guyer ed., 2006).
65
Many have discussed Kant’s idea of punishment as a formal vindication of law. See,
e.g., B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF RIGHT: A
COMMENTARY 264 (2010); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 300–24 (2009); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES:
DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 51–53 (1985)
(discussing how a “morally neutral fashion” response would “depreciate the importance of
the rights” that criminal conduct had infringed on); B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of
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These examples present us with a justification of punishment that
acknowledges but downplays the demand basis of punishment. Punishment,
according to this approach, is a coercive practice, and as such, it must be used for
good purposes, but in this, it is no different from other state actions. As is the case
with other state actions, the pursuit of these purposes often lays constraints on the
use of punishment: both the promotion of utilitarian wellbeing and Kantian political
freedom preclude, for instance, the use of telishment, for reasons that are internal to
the purposes they serve.
2. Special Justification
The shift from a general to a special approach to justification is clearly evident
in J.S. Mill’s departure from Bentham’s utilitarianism. Bentham, as we recall, places
internal constraints on the use of punishment for the production of happiness, yet he
does not categorically limit the purpose of punishment to crime prevention.66 In
contrast, for Mill and his contemporary followers Bentham’s general appeal to a
simple, felicific, calculus, employing a unitary notion of pleasure as its driving
engine, is an affront to human liberty, the value of which, they believe, is
incommensurate with lesser sources of pleasure.67 Consequently, for authors in the
Millian tradition, best exemplified in his famous harm principle, punishment
represents a unique threat to liberty, so it can only be legitimately used to prevent
the equal threat of crime, meaning behavior that likewise threatens the liberty of
others.68
Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution in Its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151, 180–
81 (1989).
66
See BENTHAM, supra note 42, at 156–74.
67
John Stuart Mill, UTILITARIANISM 14 (2nd ed. 1864) (stating that Mill, who strove to
put a more humane face on Bentham’s utilitarianism, contends that not all pleasures are cut
from the same cloth and that the contribution of some higher forms of pleasure to one’s
overall happiness is incommensurate with that of lower pleasures. It is better, Mill argues, to
be a “Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”); see JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 17–18, 65–66 (Alan Ryan ed., Penguin Classics 2006) (1859)
[hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY] (noting that paramount among these pleasures is the exercise
of personal liberty, for this represents pleasure of a uniquely human form, transcending the
immediate brutishness of pleasure and pain: “He who lets the world, or his own portion of
it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of
imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.”); see also JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 35, 116 (1984)
(addressing contemporary equation of wrongdoing with coercion) [hereinafter FEINBERG,
HARM TO OTHERS]; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 28–30 (1986); SUSAN MENDUS, TOLERATION AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 51–55
(1989); Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
179, 192 (1969).
68
For Mill, the problem is that the majority of people are conformists, who do not value
individuality and therefore seek to repress any signs of individualism that disturb the
consensus. See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 67, at 18, 65–66. On the unique meaning of
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As Joel Feinberg, a contemporary Millian maintains, the uniqueness of
punishment is a result of its coerciveness, so profoundly connected to liberty that the
absence of coercion defines the meaning of liberty itself.69 Although human freedom
is constrained in many ways, physically, biologically, psychologically, and socially,
the Millian approach views punishment and crime as distinctly coercive limitations
of liberty.70 This shared distinctiveness, they believe, means that punishment could
only be justified by virtue of its ability to deter crime.71 For this reason, while the
state is free to exercise control over the individual in order to promote various
utilitarian ends, it can only do so as long it does not do so coercively, i.e., through
punishment.72
Unfortunately, Mill never quite gets to explaining why the coerciveness of
punishment and crime is so markedly different from the other ways in which
individual liberty is restricted.73 Like Mill, contemporary authors who justify

liberty for Mill’s harm principle, see MENDUS, supra note 67, at 51–55; Berlin, supra note
67, at 179, 192.
69
As Feinberg puts it:
Not all forms of constraint and compulsion are of equal interest to the social and
political philosopher. If there is a special kind of freedom that deserves to be
called “political freedom” or “liberty,” it must consist in the absence of that one
special kind of constraint called coercion, which is the deliberate forceful
interference in the affairs of human beings by other human beings.
JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 7 (Elizabeth Beardsley & Monroe Beardsley eds.,
1973) [herenafter FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY].
70
See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 67, at 18, 22–63. For a discussion of this aspect
in Mill’s thought see, for example, David Edwards, Toleration and Mill’s Liberty of Thought
and Discussion, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 87 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988).
71
MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 67, at 17.
72
Id. at 16 (“These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him,
or persuading him, or entreating him, but not compelling him, or visiting him with any evil
in case he do otherwise.”).
73
Id. at 95 (stating that for Mill this demarcation involves no more than a feigned
difficulty, easily undone by common sense). Others, however, concede that this challenge
could hardly be shrugged. As Feinberg ultimately admits, the definition of coerciveness
“absolutely require[s] the help of supplementary principles, some of which represent
controversial moral decisions and maxims of justice.” JOEL FEINBERG, The Interest in Liberty
on the Scales, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY 30, 30 (1980); see also FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 69, at 9;
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 67, at 52; JOEL FEINBERG, Legal Paternalism, in
RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 110, 123–25 (1980); RICHARD E.
FLATHMAN, WILLFUL LIBERALISM: VOLUNTARISM AND INDIVIDUALITY IN POLITICAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE 62 (1992); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204–211 (1987);
Bernard Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in COERCION 30, 33 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1972); John Horton, Toleration, Morality and Harm, in ASPECTS OF
TOLERATION: PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 113, 115 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1985);
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punishment as a form of deterrence often assume that there is something unique
about the way in which punishment diminishes liberty, inherently different from
other ways in which the state can negatively affect its citizens.74
Surprisingly, a similar approach to the justification of punishment is
characteristic of the view commonly thought to be diametrically opposed to
deterrence, that of retributivism.75 As noted above, despite Kant’s more general
approach to the justification of punishment, contemporary retributivists often draw
support from Kant’s moral theory, at times making specific reference to several
passing comments he makes in favor of the special retributive approach.76 In
accordance with Kant’s turn to the actor’s will as the decisive factor in the moral
composition of her actions,77 many retributivists believe that crime and punishment
are unique phenomena by virtue of the special kind of willing they involve, namely
the intentional treatment of another as means to an exterior ends.78 For this reason,
many retributivist believe that punishment could only be justified when it is directed
at the promotion of a morally valuable end: the infliction of deserved suffering, i.e.,
suffering that mirrors the wrongdoer’s own wicked act.79 Unfortunately, like the
Millian form of justification, retributivists commonly fail to elaborate what makes
punishment so unique, other than asserting its necessary connection to crime—an
avoidance for which critics such as H.L.A. Hart complain that it is either “a

Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 155,
156 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988).
74
See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 42, 331–32.
75
See, e.g., Robert A. Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 381–82 (1979).
76
See generally Hill, supra note 56 (arguing that Kant’s “mature theory of justice
implies that the principle wrongdoers ought to suffer can have only a contingent, limited,
and derivative role as a practical principle. This interpretation . . . is compatible with several
famous passages where Kant seems to take a stronger retributive position.”).
77
KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 60, 41–45.
78
See, e.g., BRUDNER, supra note 58, at 5 (connecting the meaning of free will to the
justification of punishment); LUCAS, supra note 24, at 124–27 (arguing that the quintessential
feature of punishment is that it is intended to be unwelcome); Berman, supra note 33, at 267
(“Punishment stands in need of justification both on account of the fact that it causes the
punished person to suffer and on account of the supposed fact that, by intentionally inflicting
suffering, it infringes an individual’s rights.”); id. at 279 (“Because wrongdoers experience
suffering as a bad, a usual way to respect them is to not cause them pain. But insofar as they
have exercised their wills to violate legitimate interests of others, it is also plausible that
causing them to suffer on account of their willing respects them too.”); Falls, supra note 57,
at 28 (seeing the voluntariness of wrongdoing as the reason for which the wrongdoer and she
alone should be punished).
79
Mark R. Fondacaro & Megan J. O’Toole, American Punitiveness and Mass
Incarceration: Psychological Perspectives on Retributive and Consequentialist Responses
to Crime, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 477, 481 (2015).
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mysterious piece of moral alchemy” or “the abandonment of any serious attempt to
provide a moral justification for punishment.”80
C. Should Expressivism Be Special or General?
Of the two approaches examined above, expressivism, I believe, is clearly more
at home with the general approach to justification. For some critics, this is a sign of
its inadequacy, but this is only so if viewed from the perspective of the special
approach.81 Which of the two views is preferable?
The answer to this question can benefit from a historical observation on the
modern project of justifying punishment. At the inception of modern penology,
Cesare Beccaria insisted that punishment can only be justified when it derives from
“absolute necessity,” subsequently arguing that such necessity can be achieved only
when punishment is used to prevent future crime.82 Beccaria, however, qualifies this
notion by noting that “[t]he proposition may be made general thus: every act of
authority between one man and another that does not derive from absolute necessity
is tyrannical.”83 Indeed, punishment ought not to be needlessly used, but this is also
true of any state action. The necessity of state action, penal or otherwise, need not
be categorically restricted to any single purpose, including crime prevention;
instead, it must be judged on its contribution to the underlying purpose of the legal
system as a whole, be it deontological or utilitarian.
The choice between the general and special modes of justification is not one
between equally available views. As we saw, for both the Millian and the
retributivist, the shared uniqueness connecting crime and punishment remains very
80

HART, supra note 37, at 234–35. “In the end” as Morris Cohen likewise observes,
rather than explain how punishment derives from crime, Kant, and the retributivists who
follow him, fall back on “the assumption that just as our moral conscience tells us that ‘Thou
shalt not kill’ is an absolute duty for the individual, so is ‘You shall kill the murderer’ an
equally absolute duty for the community.” Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal
Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 992 (1940); see also MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 46 (arguing that
without further argumentative work, “the retributive reaction would seem to be less a
consequence of our regarding one another as capable of agency, and more a matter of appeal
to some kind of ‘celestial mechanics’ in which every criminal action . . . deserves an ‘equal
and opposite reaction,’ in the shape of punishment.”); Benn, supra note 52, at 327 (“what
pass for retributivist justifications of punishment in general, can be shown to be either denials
of the need to justify it, or mere reiterations of the principle to be justified, or disguised
utilitarianism”); Dolinko, Retributivism, supra note 35, at 518–22 (arguing against the
Kantian duty to punish); Hanna, supra note 26, at 123 (criticizing the questionable reliability
and justificatory strength of the intuitions on which retributivism rests); Murphy, supra note
56 at 523; Pearl, supra note 2, at 286–293.
81
See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 26, at 134; Lee, supra note 5, at 220.
82
See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS: AND OTHER WRITINGS 11
(Aaron Thomas, ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen, trans., 2008) (“As the great
Montesquieu says, every punishment that does not derive from absolute necessity is
tyrannical.”).
83
Id.
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much inexplicable. A more functional explanation of this uniqueness can, however,
be found in the sociological meaning of punishment, as explored by René Girard. In
his seminal depiction of “sacred violence,” Girard suggests that the belief in the
exceptionality of crime and punishment serves an important social and
psychological function of differentiation.84 As Girard’s brilliant analysis suggests,
the ritualistic linking of crime and punishment has, throughout history, served as a
way of alleviating the pressures caused by mimetic desire, doing so by creating and
reaffirming the distinction between the sacred and the profane.85 Famously
describing the “scapegoating mechanism” animating punishment, Girard
demonstrates how society is founded on the ability to sublimate such volatile desires
into moments of “sacred,” i.e., exceptional violence, first attributed to the wrongdoer
and then to the communal response expunging and sanctifying it.86 As he observes,
the exceptionality of crime and punishment is not a corollary of some hidden quality
they share but, instead, represents the purpose they serve as an affirmation of order
against the threat of blurring social boundaries.87
In rejecting expressivism since its justification of punishment is equally
applicable to state actions that do not involve hard treatment or respond to crime,
the hard treatment objection essentially demands that it adheres to the special mode
of justification. Girard’s analysis not only allows us to see the conventionality of
this requirement, but also cautions us as to the dangers of believing that there is some
inherent truth to it.88 Punishment surely requires justification, and given the toll it
takes from those upon which it is inflicted and from society as a whole, there is good
reason to demand that punishment’s justification exceeds that of non-penal state
actions.89 Suggesting, however, that there is something exceptionally wicked about
crime, which alone is capable of justifying punishment, risks transforming criminal
law into a holy crusade.90

84

See generally RENÉ GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (Patrick Gregory trans.,

1977).

85

See RENÉ GIRARD, THE SCAPEGOAT 24–44 (Yvonne Freccero trans., Johns Hopkins
University Press 1989) (1982) [hereinafter GIRARD, THE SCAPEGOAT].
86
See GIRARD, supra note 84, at 143–68.
87
See GIRARD, THE SCAPEGOAT, supra note 85, at 45–56.
88
See GIRARD, supra note 84, at 1–38.
89
See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 NOÛS 447, 450–51
(1992).
90
See, e.g., Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA
STATUTE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 257, 267 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988) (noting the
pragmatic necessity in separating criminalization, as the decision that constitutes intolerable
behavior, from moral epistemology); Rainer Forst, Tolerance as a Virtue of Justice, 4 PHIL.
EXPL. 193, 195 (2001) (regarding this difficulty as the “paradox of drawing the limits” of
toleration); John Steele, A Seal Pressed in the Hot Wax of Vengeance: A Girardian
Understanding of Expressive Punishment, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 35, 68 (2001) (“The moral
panics, insanity induced by demagoguery, and stubborn public vengefulness that are
chronically associated with expressive punishment are best understood as symptoms of the
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Against the hard treatment objection, expressivism ought to stand for the
recognition of the conventionality of the connection between punishment and crime,
and the important social function this connection serves. Punishment, as we will see
in the remainder of the Article, is not some horrible weapon to be used to smite evil
wrongdoers, but a legal tool for the promotion of a political end. The real question,
to which I will now turn, is whether this purpose makes it justifiable.
II. EXPRESSING VALUES
Punishment, the expressive theory argues, is justified as a conventional device
for the expression of condemnation.91 In Part I, I argued that this modest form of
justification is not, in itself, a reason to reject expressivism, but that this still gives
us no reason for which punishment is justifiable on the expressive account.
“‘Expression’ itself,” as A.J. Skillen rightly notes, “is no adequate ethic, any more
than is sincerity. Some of the worst deeds have been, no doubt, sincere
expressions.”92 Indeed, if expressivism were to merely stress the communicative
element in punishment, it would be no more than a description of punishment,
adding little to the traditional justifications of deterrence and retribution.93
What expressivism adds, in fact, is the insight concerning punishment’s
conventionality, first, as we have seen, by exposing the conventional nature of the
means of punishment and the connection between crime and punishment, but also,
as will be discussed below, in the idea that punishment is justified for its contribution
to social conventions, embodied in the community’s values.94 As Dan Kahan
observes, the suggestion that punishment expresses values ultimately sets the
expressive theory apart from other theories of punishment:
archaic scapegoating mechanism . . . .”); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments
Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 774 n.198 (1998).
91
Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400.
92
Skillen, supra note 21, at 521.
93
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 15, at 1357–76 (“Morality is surely plural and complex
– it incorporates a wide variety of moral factors, such as overall well-being, equality, status
and self-respect, deontological constraints, the factors of desert and responsibility, and other
factors that, in various ways, may seem to involve linguistic meaning – but in every case the
purportedly express factor turns out to be nonexpressive.”); Davis, supra note 21, at 311, 319
(arguing that expressivism inherits the problems of retributivism); Erik Luna, Punishment
Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
205, 218–19 (2003) (equating expressivism with retributivism); Primoratz, supra note 52, at
202 (arguing that expressivism is torn between retributive and utilitarian arguments); Skillen,
supra note 21, at 511 (arguing that expressivism is merely a “spiritual form of retributivism,”
and that expressivism is a mix between retributivism and utilitarianism, exacerbating the
difficulties both invoke).
94
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420
(1999) (punishment signals “society’s commitment to the values that the wrongdoer’s act
denies.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2028 (1996) (punishment speaks “on behalf of the nation’s basic principles and
commitments.”).
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[d]eterrence justifies punishment to prevent harm to others; retributivism
confines it to those who voluntarily choose to inflict such harm. The
expressive theory, by contrast, appears to emphasize neither consequences
nor choices, but rather the enforcement of society’s moral values.95
The real question expressivism has to account for, therefore, is whether it is
justifiable to enforce society’s values through punishment96 As described below,
expressive authors usually address this question in utilitarian, Kantian, and Hegelian
terms.
A. The Utility of Expressing Values
For some authors, the benefits produced by the penal expression of values are
primarily factors to be taken into consideration when deciding whether the projected
beneficial consequences of punishment outweigh the expenses and suffering it is
likely to produce.97 According to this view, the expression of values can have various
beneficial implications: it can increase social cohesion, facilitate collaboration,
decrease—or enliven—social conflicts, and the like.98 Feinberg thus argues that “the
condemnatory aspect of punishment [serves] a socially useful purpose,” which for
him includes authoritative disavowal, symbolic non-acquiescence, vindication of the
law, and absolution of others.99 Rather than argue that expressivism justifies
punishment as such, these authors rely on the traditional utilitarian justification to
argue that without understanding the expressive ways in which criminal law and
punishment operate, any attempt to use them to produce desirable results would
likely miss the target.100
The main problem with this approach is its evident social relativism.101
Punishment, this view seems to imply, serves an important social function in its
support of social values, regardless of the form and substance of these values. In
95

Kahan, supra note 3, at 596; see also Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments
Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions
Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2206–15 (2001); Tasioulas, supra note 32, at 296.
96
Skillen, supra note 21, at 521 (asking the question expressivism needs to answer is
“which values should have acceptance and priority and therefore be expressed?”).
97
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1513 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Punishment
Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 692–93 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 94,
2029–30.
98
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 94, at 485–92 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of
the criminal reification of social conflicts); Sunstein, supra note 94, at 2029–30 (assessing
the utilitarian benefits of criminal value-expression).
99
Feinberg, supra note 3, at 420.
100
See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 97, at 1516; Feinberg, supra note 3, at 404–
08; Sunstein, supra note 94, at 2029–30.
101
Skillen, supra note 21, at 519.
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appealing to utilitarian arguments, expressivists who hold this view risk ignoring the
difference between promoting liberal and illiberal, just and unjust values.102 This
color-blindness is an inherent feature of utilitarianism, translating all questions of
value into considerations of utility, but the moral challenge it presents us with is
exacerbated by coupling it with the idea that regardless of their substance, the
promotion of values through punishment could be justified out of utility.103
B. Expressing the Right Values
In response to the concern of moral relativism, some authors suggest that
punishment is justified not for the promotion of values as such but for the expression
of the right values, commonly understood in Kantian terms.104 Specifically, these
authors often frame crime and punishment in terms of their relation to the value of
equality.105 Jean Hampton, for example, writes that punishment
is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of the victim
denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that
not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but
does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.106
Essential to this approach is the idea that the evil of the wrongdoer’s deed lies
in her denial of her equality to the victim, effectively diminishing the victim’s worth
to elevate her own.107 In this view, crimes are evil due to their negative effect on the
victim’s social estimation, which, Hampton suggests, is translatable to a moral harm:
“a person is morally injured when she is the target of behavior whose meaning,
appropriately understood by members of the cultural community in which the
behavior occurs, represents her value as less than the value she should be
accorded.”108 Punishment, Hampton argues, reinstates equality by expressively
denying “what the wrongdoer’s events have attempted to establish, thereby lowering

102

Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL
THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 126 (2008); Kahan, supra note 3, at 599; von Hirsch, supra note
57, at 56.
103
See, e.g., Skillen, supra note 21, at 520.
104
See, e.g., Pablo de Greiff, Deliberative Democracy and Punishment 5 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 373, 390 (2002); Hill, supra note 56, at 418–22.
105
See, e.g., Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE
L. REV. 713, 715 (2008) (“[W]e punish harm not only in order to express something to the
offender and about the offender, but also to express something to the victim and about the
victim to others.”).
106
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms].
107
See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 3, at 217; John Kleinig, Punishment and Moral
Seriousness, 25 ISR. L. REV. 401, 418 (1991).
108
Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 106, at 1670.
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the wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and annulling the act of diminishment.”109 In
reinstating the value of equality, punishment is justified as an expressive cure to the
victim’s diminished moral stature in the eyes of others.110
The evil of crime in this view is not the immediate harm it causes to the victim
or the community, but the denial of equality that is conveyed by the act; it is this evil
that punishment aims to annul.111 “A criminal act,” George Fletcher likewise argues,
“establishes a particular relationship” between the wrongdoer and the victim, in
which the offender “gains a form of dominance that continues after the crime has
supposedly occurred.”112 Punishment, on Fletcher’s view, is meant “to overcome
this dominance and reestablish the equality of victim and offender.”113 Likewise,
John Kleinig contends that punishment “negates or cancels the claim implicit in
wrongdoing, that the interests of others are not all that important, that the wrongdoer
is superior to others — or at least may determine how others are to be treated.”114
There is, however, a critical flaw in this line of argument. If, as the proponents
of this brand of expressivism insist, the value of equality is objectively valid, then
how is it possible that the wrongdoer so effectively damages that value?115 If, in
contrast, the wrongdoer’s actions do not “harm” the value of equality but only falsely
contradicts it, why go through all the trouble of condemning it instead of simply
refuting the wrongdoer’s error?116 As Christopher Ciocchetti reminds us, “[f]alse
moral messages just are not the kind of thing that the criminal law punishes”; “true
moral messages, while potentially useful, are, by themselves, not sufficiently
morally important to justify punishment.”117 If punishment merely expresses the
undeniable rationality of equality, why should it not be responded to, as Anthony
Duff asks, with “a public and formal declaration, or the imposition of a purely
symbolic punishment,” to “make it clear to everyone that we do deny the demeaning
message implicit in the crime?”118
109
Id. at 1686–87 (“Punishment affirms as a fact that the victim has been wronged, and
as a fact that he is owed a certain kind of treatment from others. Hence, on this view, it is
natural for the victim to demand punishment because it is a way for the community to restore
his moral status after it has been damaged by his assailant.”).
110
See Hampton, supra note 3, at 217; see also BENNETT, supra note 102, at 191;
Ciocchetti, supra note 40, at 66; Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 37–38;
Meyer, supra note 6, at 119.
111
Hampton, supra note 3, at 217.
112
George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 51, 57 (1999).
113
Id.
114
Kleinig, supra note 107, at 418.
115
This weakness is already implicit in its Kantian roots. See Duff, Penal
Communications, supra note 29, at 36–37.
116
See, e.g., Peter Königs, The Expressivist Account of Punishment, Retribution, and
the Emotions, 16 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 1029, 1044 (2013).
117
Ciocchetti, supra note 40, at 70; see also GOLASH, supra note 2, at 52–60; Brian
Slattery, The Myth of Retributive Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 27, 33 (Wesley
Cragg ed., 1992); Dolinko, supra note 36, at 551.
118
Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 40.
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C. Reconnecting with Values
A third strand of expressivism seeks to justify the promotion of values with an
argument that at the same time (unnecessarily) responds to the hard treatment
problem by adopting what I have referred to above as a special approach to
justification.119 The unique wrongness of crime, on this view, comes from the
distance it creates between the wrongdoer and society’s values, and it is the purpose
of punishment to eliminate this distance.120 In response to the wrongdoer’s painful
loss of “allegiance to the values of society,” punishment, qua hard treatment, is
justified as a form of moral education meant to better the moral composition of the
wrongdoer by reconnecting her to society’s values.121 In this fashion, Robert Nozick,
one of the first to justify punishment along these lines, suggests that the purpose of
punishment is to “(a) connect the wrongdoer to value qua value (b) so that value qua
value has a significant effect in his life, as significant as his own flouting of correct
values.”122 To explain the “significant effect” of punishment, Nozick argues that
“when [the wrongdoer] undergoes punishment these correct values are not totally
without effect in his life (even though he does not follow them), because we hit him
over the head with them.”123 Certainly, punishment hits the wrongdoer over the head,
physically or figuratively, but why is doing so a meaningful and effective way of
“connecting” her to “correct values?”
I suggest that the answer to this question is to be found in the Hegelian
inspiration of this strand of expressivism.124 Hegel is often mentioned in penal
scholarship with reference to his peculiar yet influential suggestions that punishment
119

See Jean Hampton, Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A Case Study in
the Expressive Meaning of the Law, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 23, 40 (1998) (This is evident, for
instance, in Hampton’s adoption of the view that in addition to its general purpose,
punishment also serves the special purpose of curing the wrongdoer’s soul through the
infliction of hard treatment); see also DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at
233–36; Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 33–35 (arguing that unless
punishment is a necessary means of achieving the moral end it serves it cannot be justifiable).
120
See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 3, at 40.
121
See id. at 40; see also, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 97, at 1508
(distinguishing between expression and communication); Dolinko, supra note 36, at 549
(distinguishing between the two arguments Hampton makes); Duff, Penal Communications,
supra note 29, at 32–33 (distinguishing between one-sided expression and reciprocal
communication); Garvey, supra note 90, at 739 (distinguishing shaming punishment from
punishment as moral education).
122
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 375 (1981).
123
Id. at 375; see also Slattery, supra note 117, at 33; von Hirsch, supra note 57, at 59.
124
For a recent exploration of this connection, see Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism:
The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (2016). For similar
discussions, see, for example, Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 111, 115, 131, 142 (Jules Coleman ed., 1988) [hereinafter Hampton, The Retributive
Idea]; see also Stephen P. Garvey, A Hegelian Criminal Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 147, 157–
58 (2011); Hampton, supra note 3, at 208; Meyer, supra note 5, at 119; Skillen, supra note
20, at 511.
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“annuls” crime and that the wrongdoer “wills” her punishment.125 These ideas,
however, are only specific aspects of Hegel’s overarching theme of actualization, by
which he means the progress of the individual from insular and abstract
consciousness to objectively true knowledge, achieved through her convergence
with Geist—the unified mindfulness of the world.126 In the Hegelian worldview, the
individual can only exist by itself in the abstract, alienated from herself and the
world.127 By reconnecting with the community—which for Hegel manifests the
Geist in its progress through history—the wrongdoer is uplifted from her wretched
insular existence and brought closer to a meaningful existence.128
Authors such as Duff, Hampton, and Nozick speak of the beneficial moral
effect punishment arguably produces by connecting the wrongdoer to the communal
values she abandoned; this idea makes non-metaphorical sense only if read in light
of the political community’s role in Hegelian teleology as a necessary conduit
between the individual and objective truth.129 Punishment, as the forced realignment
between the wrongdoer and society’s values, is justified in this Hegelian fashion as
a unique remedy to the wrongdoer’s metaphysical ailment:
A person can find well-being only within a community which is,
necessarily, structured by certain shared values and concerns, and within
the kinds of relationships which such a community makes possible. A
criminal who flouts the just laws of her community thereby injures herself:
she separates herself from the values on which the community and her own
well-being depend [. . .]She may not in fact be made consciously unhappy
by her crime [. . .][b]ut this shows only that she, and those with whom she
lives, have turned away from the values which should concern them; that
they fail or refuse to see how such criminal pursuits are inconsistent with
the existence of a community within which any worthwhile human life is
possible; and that their relationships are themselves corrupted by false
values. If she would only recognize the moral truth about her criminal
125

See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise
in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 117–19 (1998); Ekow N. Yankah,
Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral
Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1060–62 (2004).
126
A relatively concise pronunciations of Hegel’s teleological dialectics can be found
in G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 11, 51 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977); see also
CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 47 (Alan Montefiore et al. eds., 1979).
127
See, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 126, at 21; Tronn Overend, Alienation: A Conceptual
Analysis, 35 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 301, 306–07 (1975); Gavin Rae, Hegel,
Alienation, and the Phenomenological Development of Consciousness, 20 INT’L J. PHIL.
STUD. 23, 25 (2012).
128
For explicitly Hegelian theories of punishment see, for example, Alan Brudner, In
Defence of Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 93, 93–94 (Wesley Cragg ed.,
1990); Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1581–83 (1994).
129
See Kleinfeld, supra note 124, at 1543.
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attitudes and activities, she would see how they are injurious to her true
well-being.130
If we are to understand these words as something other than mere platitudes,
we must acknowledge their embeddedness in the Hegelian conception of the
individual.131 Although Hegel accepts the fundamental Kantian ideal of equality,132
his teleological philosophy insists that the individual’s existence becomes more
meaningful, more actual, in her encounter with others, en route to the final
convergence with Geist.133 This encounter, Hegel tells us, is initially perceived as
the violent threat of self-destruction, amounting to what he describes as the life and
death struggle for recognition, only to result, as his master/slave dialectic tells us, in
a mutually-dependent recognition that brings with it the ascent to a greater level of
self-consciousness.134 From this moment on, individuals—now parts of society—
constantly further their self-actualization against the forceful imposition of the
community’s values, moving from the inner realm of essence to the external realm
of concrete existence.135
Animated by this teleological understanding of values, the special expressive
approach argues that by committing a crime and alienating herself from the
community’s values, the wrongdoer wrongs herself by making her moral existence
less meaningful, as the recognition she receives from others diminishes.136 When
130

DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 256–57; see also Duff, Penal
Communications, supra note 29, at 48; R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal
Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 371–80 (1993) [hereinafter Duff, Choice, Character, and
Criminal Liability].
131
See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 48–55
(2003) [hereinafter DUFF, PUNISHMENT] (admitting his communitarian/Hegelian conception
of the self); Henrique Carvalho, Terrorism, Punishment, and Recognition, 15 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 345, 353–63 (2012) (connecting the relations implicit in expressive theories with
Hegel’s notion of recognition).
132
See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 128, at 16–17; see generally Jay Drydyk, Hegel’s
Politics: Liberal or Democratic?, 16 CAN. J. PHIL. 99 (1986) (discussing Hegelianism in the
French Revolution and the tensions with the Kantian idea of equality).
133
See HEGEL, supra note 126, at 290–91; see also ALAN PATTEN, HEGEL’S IDEA OF
FREEDOM 130–33 (1999) (discussing the idea of community as necessary for a more
meaningful existence).
134
See HEGEL, supra note 126, at 116–19; see also PATTEN, supra note 133, at 130–33;
ROBERT STERN, ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHY GUIDEBOOK TO HEGEL AND THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 78, 113–14 (2002).
135
See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 241 (Allen W. Wood
ed., 2011) [hereinafter, HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT]; G.W.F. HEGEL,
HEGEL’S LOGIC 247–48 (William Wallace trans., 2009); see also STEPHEN HOULGATE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL: FREEDOM, TRUTH, AND HISTORY 78–82 (2nd ed. 2005); TAYLOR,
supra note 126, at 1–14.
136
See, e.g., Falls, supra note 57, at 40–41 (discussing this idea as a form of “earned”
moral respect); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263,
265 (1981) (“[T]he price paid for unconcern is some rupture in relationships, a separation

260

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

this approach speaks of the evil suffered by the wrongdoer for her crimes, it refers
not to some psychological or metaphorical aches but to the “pain” of losing meaning,
which affects the wrongdoer whether she is conscious of it or not:
the immoral person thinks he is getting away with something, he thinks
his immoral behavior costs him nothing. But that is not true; he pays the
cost of having a less valuable existence. He pays that penalty, though he
doesn’t feel it or care about it. Not all penalties are felt.137
Punishment, so the special expressive theory argues, repairs this evil by
reconnecting the wrongdoer to the community, restoring her diminished moral status
by once again violently imposing the community’s values on her.138
But exactly how does punishment eradicate the alienation of crime? Duff
speaks of the three R’s punishment aims to accomplish: repentance, reform, and
reconciliation.139 The question remains, however, as to what benefit there is in
coerced repentance. Of even more consequence is the question of how imposing
punishment for these purposes can be justified as a way of making the wrongdoer’s
existence more meaningful.140 All too often the answers to these questions border on
metaphor: the wrongdoer, we are told, is “hit over the head” with the community’s

from others, a feeling ill at ease with oneself, and some inevitable loss of emotional
sustenance and sense of identity . . . .”); Tasioulas, supra note 32, at 294 (“[B]laming involves
a withdrawal of full recognition from the wrong-doer, because their flouting of moral
demands diminishes their status as a member of the relevant moral community.”).
137
NOZICK, supra note 122, at 409; see also Duff, Penal Communications, supra note
29, at, at 48–49.
138
See, e.g., MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 247–51 (arguing that punishment can
“deepen the agent’s understanding of morality and lead to her becoming a fully morally
autonomous being.”); NOZICK, supra note 122, at 379 (“Wrong puts things out of joint in
that acts and persons are unlinked with correct values; this is the disharmony introduced by
wrongdoing. Punishment does not wipe out the wrong, the past is not changed, but the
disconnection with value is repaired (though in a second best way); nonlinkage is
eradicated.”); Dubber, supra note 128, at 1583 (“[T]he dialectic naturally moves from crime
to punishment as punishment follows crime in the process of Reason’s self-actualization.”);
Meyer, supra note 6, at 119 (“If separation is the result of wrong, then punishment is perhaps
best understood as a practice repairing that separation, as Morris, Garvey, and Hegel
understand it.”).
139
See Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 47–51.
140
See, e.g., DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 243–44 (admitting that
that there is no real way of translating the hard treatment of punishment to the moral language
and the desired moral outcome it purports to produce); MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 89–
91 (discussing the difficulty of forcefully educating the wrongdoer); Garvey, supra note 90,
at 769–770 (arguing that moral education by punishment can be unnecessary or futile);
Hampton, supra note 3, at 233–34 (admitting the difficulty of appealing to moral education
to justify punishment).

2020]

CONVENTIONS AND CONVICTIONS

261

values, “woken up” by punishment, and the like.141 Detached from their Hegelian
roots, such explanations cannot but be seen as a denial of the need to justify
punishment.142 Hegelian dialectics, however, purport to give these words nonmetaphorical meaning by suggesting that the healing power of punishment
represents the kind of superior access to true knowledge that the community
provides, imprinted on the individual in the form of external force. 143
Admittedly, the proponents of the special expressive justification seldom make
the appeal to Hegelian dialectics explicit.144 Yet these extravagant metaphysical
presumptions undermine this strand of expressivism none the less. In insisting that
punishment can only be justified as an exhaustive and inimitable response to crime,
this view casts the moral education of the wrongdoer—her realignment with the
community’s values—as the sole way in which she can overcome the pains of
alienation.145 In insisting on the necessary connection between punishment and
crime, the proponents of this approach essentially suggest that there is some inherent
therapeutic truth to communal values, unavailable to the individual who distances
herself from them. This truth, they argue, does not represent any universal moral
laws or consequential benefits but, rather, is the manifestation of the inherent
metaphysical importance of communal life.146
141
See Garvey, supra note 90, at 763 (“[T]he state punishes the offender in order to
‘wake him up,’ to get him to recognize and understand why what he has done was wrong,
and ideally, to repent.”); Slattery, supra note 117, at 33 (criticizing the metaphorical and
mystical terms in which hard treatment is described); von Hirsch, supra note 57, at 59
(criticizing Nozick’s lack of clarity).
142
As Marcus Dubber notes, doing so essentially requires connection with Hegel’s
more problematic fundamental assumptions: “Demetaphysicizing Hegel without deHegeling him is tricky business. Merely to envision his political philosophy, or for that
matter any other aspect of his philosophical system, without his metaphysics requires
considerable effort, as Hegel equated philosophy with metaphysics.” Dubber, supra note
128, at 1585.
143
See PATTEN, supra note 133, at 135.
144
Some explicit appeals to Hegel include Hampton, The Retributive Idea, supra note
124, at 131, 142; Hampton, supra note 3, at 208.
145
See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 90, at 766.
146
See, e.g., DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 131, at 51 (focusing “not on the question
of how ‘I’ should live or what associations ‘I’ should form, but of how ‘we’ should live.”);
MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 191 (“Rather than understand one’s ends as those of a
separate, asocial being, and as better secured through co-operation, one must understand
one’s ends as the ends of a co-operative being. One's flourishing is thus not merely
contingently aligned with the flourishing of the whole, but necessarily connected to it.”);
R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, in PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL
THEORY 57–58 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (arguing that autonomy could only be understood
“as autonomy within a shared form of life, which alone can give the notion any substantive
sense”); Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, supra note 130, at 382–83 (“Our
life together, as a community, requires us to develop and sustain appropriate attitudes
towards and concerns for each other – appropriate dispositions of thought, feeling and
motivation. The criminal law, which embodies the values central and essential to that
communal life, should thus be concerned with failures or defects in such dispositions, and
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In turning to Hegelian theory as a way of addressing both the problem of hard
treatment and of using punishment to express values, expressivism of the special
sort inevitably inherits Hegel’s elevation of one’s communal belonging, attributing
to the community the exclusive ability to propel the individual towards a more
meaningful existence, even against her (wretched) will.147 This, as Duff admits,
represents a substantial departure from those liberal theories that emphasize the
separate and distinct identity of each individual, allocating her “an extensive private
sphere which includes her moral beliefs and attitudes.”148 Still, as Charles Taylor
notes, what is most troubling about this worldview is not so much the extravagant
metaphysical assumptions it makes but the unadulterated optimism and certainty
with which it makes them, putting immense, almost unlimited, trust in politics and
its presumed progressivism.149 To hold such views is to have faith that despite its
occasional errors, the community’s interaction with the individual and the
imposition of its values is fundamentally beneficial. Surely, this view asks too much
of us. To suggest that the runaway slave is somehow being bettered by her penal
reunification with the communal value of slavery seems to give too much credit to
the inherent truthfulness of communal values, despite Hegel’s best dialectical
attempts to claim otherwise.150
with the criticism and correction of such failures or defects.”); Meyer, supra note 6, at 120
(arguing that for this approach, “[a]nything that denies the fact (not the statement) of
togetherness with others is crime. The relationship at stake is not the communication between
victim and offender or even offender and society. The relationship is just the fact of
togetherness in the world as creatures who reason.”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism,
Moral Education and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 8–9 (1985) (noting that the
moral education approach is more at home in a Hegelian, non-liberal theory).
147
See HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 135, at 46–49;
HEGEL, supra note 126, at 262–71; see also KARL AMERIKS, KANT AND THE FATE OF
AUTONOMY: PROBLEMS IN THE APPROPRIATION OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 313–17
(Robert B. Pippin et al. eds., 2000); NOZICK, supra note 122, at 410; Sean Sayers, The Actual
and the Rational, in HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY 143, 147 (David Lamb ed., 1987);
Andrew Arato, A Reconstruction of Hegel’s Theory of Civil Society, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
1363, 1372 (1989).
148
DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 131, at 56.
149
As Charles Taylor puts it, what separates us from Hegel’s writing is “the sense men
had that the horrors and nightmares of history, the furies of destruction and cruelty which
remain enigmatic to agent and victim, were behind us. This sense, which Hegel expressed in
his philosophy . . . is just about unrecoverable even by the most optimistic of our
contemporaries.” TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 135.
150
For Hegel’s Master/slave dialectic, see HEGEL, supra note 126, at 118–19. However,
see DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 131, at 60, questioning the practical desirability of this
theory given the grave risks of distortion, oppression and manipulation it gives rise to. On
this risk Garvey states:
The moral education theory of punishment asks a great deal. Of those who impose
punishment, it asks that they do so in the spirit of a parent punishing a child. Of
those who receive punishment, it asks that they respond to it and accept it as a

2020]

CONVENTIONS AND CONVICTIONS

263

III. FROM VALUES TO VALUATION
In the remainder of this Article, I want to offer a different answer to the question
of why punishment ought to be used to support social values. Doing so, I will
suggest, involves viewing the promotion of values as an indirect way of supporting
the individual interest in asserting her agency through valuation, meaning the
process of assigning value to objects and communicating this value to others.151
Values, in this sense, are not inherently valuable, but only conventional devices used
for individual self-affirmation, media through which individuals communicate their
reciprocal recognition of the other’s creative agency.152
A. The Threat of Meaninglessness
The Hegelian treatment of values, discussed above, takes its cue from the
modern threat of meaninglessness.153 Rene Descartes, who famously asserted that
the only thing we can be certain of is our thinking self, our cogito, attributed such
certainty to divine benevolence.154 David Hume’s more secular philosophy later
denied this religion-based self-validation, leaving human thought struggling with the
effort to find any sound meaning or truth in our existence.155 Max Weber later came
to describe this loss of meaning as the “disenchantment of the world,” which he
believed to be a result of modern science.156
way of making amends. All of which may be asking too much of citizens of the
modern state.
Garvey, supra note 90, at 774. See also Dolovich, supra note 40, at 313 (noting the risk to
politically disenfranchised minorities); Steele, supra note 90, at 67; Jeremy Waldron,
Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 132 (1987) (“If a person’s true self
is thought to be partly or wholly constituted by the social order, then that self cannot ask the
critical question ‘Is this the sort of order I accept? Is it one that I would have chosen?’”).
151
“Valuing,” Samuel Scheffler writes, “comprises a complex syndrome of interrelated
attitudes and dispositions, which includes but is not limited to a belief that the valued item is
valuable,” adding that it is, therefore, “an attitudinal phenomenon that has doxastic,
deliberative, motivational, and emotional dimensions.” SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, DEATH AND
THE AFTERLIFE 16–17 (Niko Kolodny ed., 2013).
152
See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, WHY WORRY ABOUT FUTURE GENERATIONS? 75–86
(2018) (offering an account of “evaluative reciprocity”); Daniel Maggen, A Critique of
Toleration (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
153
See HEGEL, supra note 126, at 51–52. See generally id. at 104–262 (discussing
Hegelian treatment of values).
154
See RENÉ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY: WITH SELECTIONS
FROM THE OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 73 (John Cottingham ed. & trans., 2013).
155
Hume was primarily responding to John Locke’s view of ideas as non-empirical
knowledge. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 24 (David Fate Norton &
Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 2011).
156
See HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 11, at 13–16
(discussing the modern rejection of inherent knowledge, including knowledge of the self);
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The profound anxiety brought about by the loss of the ability to anchor
meaning, including the belief in our existence as distinct beings, has later developed
into a central theme of existential philosophy and literature, but it does not confine
itself to this domain.157 “[T]he most terrifying feature of human life,” as Ronald
Dworkin writes, is “that we have lives to lead, and death to face, with no evident
reason to think that our living, still less how we live, makes any genuine difference
at all.”158 Hegel, who took this challenge head-on, believed that the only way to
resolutely overcome the challenge of meaninglessness and the feeling of
“homelessness” in the world it produces is found in the connection to the
community, as a gateway to actual knowledge.159 For others, particularly in the
existentialist tradition that responded to Hegel, the answer lies not in the certainty
offered by the community but in the individual’s decision to view herself as an agent,
even if this decision can only amount to an attestation of belief in her personhood.160
Taking the Hegelian path leads, as discussed above in Section II.C., to a conception
of punishment tilted towards the community and to a view of communal values as
Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 524, 544 (David Owen &
Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004).
157
See, e.g., ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., 1988); VIKTOR E.
FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING: AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGOTHERAPY (Ilse Lasch
trans., 1962); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson
trans., 1962); SØREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (Alastair Hannay trans., 1985);
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: THE PRINCIPLE TEXT OF MODERN
EXISTENTIALISM (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).
158
Ronald Dworkin, The Concept of Unenumerated Rights—Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 414 (1992).
159
See STERN, supra note 134, at 8–11; J. Glenn Gray, Homelessness and Anxiety:
Sources of the Modern Mode of Being, 48 VA. Q. REV. 24 (1972) (discussing the feeling of
homelessness and the phenomenon of anxiety).
160
One of the first to shift the focus to this decision to view oneself as an agent was
Edmund Husserl, focusing on the individual’s attitude towards the question of his existence
as a free and temporarily enduring being, “continuously constituting himself as existing . . .
not only as flowing life but also as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live
through this and that cogito, as the same I.” EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS
66 (Dorion Cairns trans., 1964) (emphasis in original); see also HEIDEGGER, supra note 157,
at 32 (“Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is
ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in
that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its
Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being.”);
PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER 21 (Kathleen Blamey trans., 1995) (suggesting that
“attestation defines the sort of certainty that hermeneutics may claim, not only with respect
to the epistemic exaltation of the cogito in Descartes, but also with respect to its humiliation
in Nietzsche and his successors”); SARTRE, supra note 157, at 595 (“[O]ur being is precisely
[this] original choice, the consciousness (of) the choice is identical with the selfconsciousness which we have. One must be conscious in order to choose, and one must
choose in order to be conscious.”); see generally JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM IS A
HUMANISM 17 (Carol Macomber trans., 2007) (describing Sartre’s defense of existentialism
against certain criticisms).
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things of inherent value, essential for the assertion of one’s agency.161 In contrast, I
will show below how adopting a more existentialist approach, geared towards the
individual’s attitude towards her agency, can help produce a more liberal conception
of values, centered not on the values themselves but rather on the individual’s
process of valuation that endows them with meaning.
B. Valuing and Self-Assurance
Even when an individual has taken to viewing herself as an agent, existential
anxiety is enduring, rearing its ugly head whenever life treats her as if she were
nothing but a lifeless object manipulated by forces beyond her control.162 Valuation,
I suggest, can be understood as a mechanism individuals employ in order to
overcome such doubts in order to persist in the affirmation of their agency.163 As
Samuel Scheffler observes, caring for the values we subscribe to considerably assists
us in treating ourselves as free continuous beings, providing “continuity amid the
flux and contingency of daily life experience” as these values “help to stabilize our
selves.”164 Although I do not intend to fully argue in favor of this view here, I will
suggest that taking this viewpoint can provide the expressive account with the theory
of value it requires.165
The key to uncovering the link between values of this kind and the individual’s
assertion of her personhood can be found, I suggest, in Kant’s often-overlooked
writing on the nature of judgment, and of aesthetic judgment in particular.166 As is
161

See discussion infra Section II.C.
Hannah Arendt most famously described the most extreme way in which personhood
might thus be eradicated as the ultimate purpose of totalitarian regimes:
162

The concentration camps not only eradicate people; they also further the
monstrous experiment, under scientifically exacting conditions, of destroying
spontaneity as an element of human behavior and of transforming people into
something that is even less than animal, namely, a bundle of reactions that, given
the same set of conditions, will always react in the same way.
Hannah Arendt, Mankind and Terror, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING 297, 304 (1994). But
this destruction of selfhood appears also in less extreme cases. As Heidegger suggests,
“‘[R]eal’ anxiety is rare. Anxiety is often conditioned by ‘physiological’ factors . . . Only
because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety
to be elicited physiologically.” HEIDEGGER, supra note 157, at 234.
163
See Maggen, supra note 152.
164
Samuel Scheffler, The Good of Toleration, in EQUALITY AND TRADITION:
QUESTIONS OF VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 312, 325 (2010).
165
This Article continues the work of Dan Kahan, which had explicitly left this
theoretical foundation wanting. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 597.
166
One of the few scholars to take serious the normative interest in this part of Kant’s
writing was Hannah Arendt, who unfortunately passed away before she was able to complete
her work on this subject. See HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 14 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1989). Arendt’s work is continued today by Jennifer
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the case with much of his philosophy, Kant’s writing on judgment is interested in
the meaning of the claims we are purporting to make when we make judgments:
when we claim that water boils at 212℉ or that it is wrong to murder the innocent,
Kant suggests that we are implicitly asserting the existence of laws of reason that
ostensibly make our claims objectively valid.167 When it comes to aesthetic
judgments, however, Kant notes that we are making a different kind of claims,
purporting to be independently valid despite their lack of objective support.168 Thus,
we may say that a piece of art is beautiful, but also that there is value in genetic
connections, in serving turkey for Thanksgiving, or in a national border.169 Such
aesthetic judgments, to which I will refer as valuative judgments, are different, Kant
suggests, from mere judgments of taste, in that, in contrast with the latter, in making
a valuative judgment the individual is making a claim that purports to be valid
regardless of her own subjective preferences.170
Valuative claims of this sort include judgments on “what we care about,” as
Richard Greenstein puts it, encompassing “goals, interests, policies, principles, and
so forth; moreover, what we care about can touch on economic, moral, political,
aesthetic, religious, and other concerns.”171 The meaning of such judgments of value,
Kant suggests, is found not in their object—meaning the values themselves—but
rather in the kind of claim they stake: a demand that others recognize the individual’s

Nedelsky, whose work has some important points of convergence with the view suggested
here. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS (2011).
167
To put it differently, despite our inability to even come close to cognizing the “laws”
that necessitate our scientific and moral convictions, such objective statements betray a
lawful disposition towards the world, an expression of the belief that our experience of it is
ultimately and unequivocally amenable to reason. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 178–79 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds. & trans., 1999) (describing this
disposition as the function of understanding); see also AMERIKS, supra note 147, at 69–70;
see generally Karl Ameriks, Kant’s Deduction of Freedom and Morality, 19 J. HIST. PHIL 53
(1981).
168
See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 91–95 (Werner S. Pluhar trans.,
1987) (1790) [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT] (describing the free lawfulness of
the imagination); see also Jennifer Nedelsky, Judgment, Diversity, and Relational Autonomy,
in JUDGMENT, IMAGINATION, AND POLITICS: THEMES FROM KANT AND ARENDT 103, 106–07
(Ronald Beiner & Jennifer Nedelsky eds., 2001); Brad Seeman, What if the Elephant Speaks?
Kant’s Critique of Judgment and an Übergang Problem in John Hick’s Philosophy of
Religious Pluralism, 54 INT’L J. PHIL. RELIGION 157, 161 (2003).
169
Kant primarily deals in this category with judgments of beauty and sublimity, but
by this he broadly refers to judgments that stand in a symbolic relationship to objective value.
See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 225–28.
170
See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 57–60 (discussing judgment
that is universally valid objectively and subjectively); see also Barbara Herman, Pluralism
and the Community of Moral Judgment, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 60, 63–64
(David Heyd ed., 1996).
171
Richard K. Greenstein, Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Values, 8 WASH. U. JURIS.
REV. 1, 4–5 (2015).
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ability to form them.172 Although our modern sensibilities force us to recognize that
the validity of such judgments only can come from the individual’s valuative attitude
towards them, we generally treat them as if they were somehow inherently
important.173
Although Kant does not explicitly detail why individuals form valuative
judgments and acknowledge their validity, he recognizes that the ability to create
judgments of value represents an unmatched form of agential freedom.174 It could,
however, be speculated that the importance of valuative judgments lies precisely in
their ability to validate one’s creative agency through others.175 In making a
valuative claim and communicating it to another, one makes oneself vulnerable to
the possibility of rebuff and ridicule, for the most rational response to such
groundless claims is that of bewilderment.176 By nonetheless expecting others to
acknowledge the validity of one’s values as judgments that go beyond mere personal
preferences, the individual thus trusts the other to recognize her as a creative agent,
capable of assigning meaning to otherwise meaningless objects.177 When such
communicative valuation succeeds, it can assist the individual in asserting her
agency against the threat of meaninglessness.
Our values, in other words, are meaningful only to the extent that they are
expressions of the ability to create and communicate meaning. Even though we often
speak of values as things of inherent importance, what matters in this description is
not whether we are correct in doing so, but rather our willingness to hold them as
meaningful and to engage with others based on this attitude.178 The subject matter
of which we speak when making a valuative judgment—the substance of our
values—is but a placeholder for our assertion of creativity; the medium of valuation
is itself the message, to borrow Marshall McLuhan’s phrasing.179 In asking others to
join us in the communal and ongoing commitment to values, we ask and expect them
172
See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 89–95 (discussing judgment
of taste as a subjective necessity that is presented as objective by presupposing a common
sense).
173
As Rudolf Makkreel notes, the thought that there might be something inherent to
these valuations would go against the heart of Kant’s critical ideas. See RUDOLF A.
MAKKREEL, IMAGINATION AND INTERPRETATION IN KANT: THE HERMENEUTICAL IMPORT OF
THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 50 (1990).
174
These kind of claims, Kant notes, exceed even the claim to freedom made by moral
judgments. See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 35; see also MAKKREEL,
supra note 173, at 55.
175
See HUSSERL, supra note 160, at 89–150 (discussing the role of inter-subjectivity).
176
See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Valuing, in EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF
VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 15, 23 (2010) (describing valuation as a form of
emotional vulnerability); Niko Kolodny, Love as Valuing a Relationship, 112 PHIL. REV.
135, 150–52 (2003) (likening love, as a form of vulnerability to valuation).
177
See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 157–62 (discussing the idea
that individuals experience sensations differently).
178
See HUSSERL, supra note 160, at 92 (discussing the notion of cultural objects).
179
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7–21
(MIT Press 1994) (1964) (suggesting that “the medium is the message.”).
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to mirror and affirm our belief in our enduring creativity, in our existence as persons
rather than as mere atemporal agents.180
C. The Conditions of Successful Valuation
If we accept the view of values as instruments for the support of agential selfassurance, then their normative appeal, including their ability to justify punishment,
becomes contingent on the ability of such values to support the function of selfassurance through valuation. In assessing whether various values are indeed
supportive of this purpose, we can make use of a set of conditions Kant referred to
as the maxims of judgment.181 For Kant, these maxims require the individual to (i)
think for herself,182 (ii) think from the standpoint of everyone else,183 and (iii) think
consistently.184 For our discussion here, I will focus on the first two maxims,
referring to them as the conditions of (1) creativity and (2) communicability,
accordingly.
1. Creativity
If an individual is to treat her valuations as signs of her creative agency, she
must first and foremost be able to view her values as her own creations rather than
something externally imposed on her.185 In contrast to the Kantian notion of moral
autonomy, this does not entail, however, that she must see herself as the sole creator
of her values.186 As other-relating claims, the formulation of values, even of one’s
most personal and intimate ones, is an inherently collaborative process, based in
social conventions and hermeneutics.187 Nevertheless, the influence of others on the
formulation of one’s values must be limited to the language and terms in which the

180

As Samuel Scheffler puts it, “through the repetitive performance of acts that express
our distinctive values and desires, we mark the world with continuities that are expressive of
ourselves. In so doing, we confirm our sense of ourselves as persistent creatures,
manufacturing, as it were, evidence to support our confidence in our persistence.” Samuel
Scheffler, The Normativity of Tradition, in EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF
VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 287, 299 (2010) [hereinafter Scheffler, The
Normativity of Tradition]. Richard Rorty makes a similar point, while emphasizing the
fetishistic nature of such constructs. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE 344–45 (1980).
181
See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 160–61.
182
See id. at 161.
183
See id. at 161–62.
184
See id. at 162.
185
See id. at 79 (discussing that a person’s taste is individually developed).
186
See id. at 15–16, 44.
187
See, e.g., ARENDT, supra note 166, at 14 (discussing the dependence of judgment on
sociability); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: T HE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 31 (1989) [hereinafter TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF] (describing the social
frameworks of meaning that are essential for communication).
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individual’s claim to valuation is voiced.188 As Charles Larmore puts it, “being fully
ourselves does not require us to free ourselves from the imprint of social
conventions—which is impossible, anyway—but only that we stop seeking our
bearings from what we believe or imagine another might expect from us.”189 What
this entails, in essence, is that values must be understood as purely conventional,
subjective creations—fetishisms of a sort—intended to serve those who participate
in their production rather than rule them.190
2. Communicability
The second condition of judgment requires that the individual voicing the
valuative judgment stakes her claim on the recognition of her creative agency rather
than on some objectively valid considerations.191 Kant describes this condition in
terms of the judgment’s communicability, or the ability of the individual to believe
that another would accept her valuation as valid despite its subjectivity.192
Essentially this condition entails that in seeking another’s recognition of her agency
through communication, the individual is appealing to the other’s agency, and not
to some objectively compelling considerations.193
This means that in order to be communicable, judgments must first present
themselves as impossibilities so that if they are indeed accepted, it is solely by virtue
of another’s free recognition of the communicator’s creativity.194 If an individual
argues that a particular value is inherently compelling, by claiming, for instance, that
they are divinely or naturally mandated, then she does not, in fact, make her claim
vulnerable to refutation as she does not expect the other to freely accept her claims.
Likewise, if she makes the statement while waving a gun, acceptance of her claim
would only be a sign of the objective validity of the material considerations to which
her gesture is alluding. In either case, no true recognition could grow out of the
other’s acceptance of the claim, for such acceptance would only be a sign of the
other’s willingness to recognize the compelling appeal of the objective
considerations the individual was invoking.

188
189

See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 79, 144, 161.
CHARLES E. LARMORE, THE PRACTICES OF THE SELF xiii (Sharon Bowman trans.,

2010).

190

See, e.g., ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 46 (1989) (discussing the first maxim of judgment). Similar
concerns are voiced by Seana Shiffrin. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Preserving the Valued
or Preserving Valuing?, in DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE 143, 144–154 (2013).
191
See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 156.
192
See id. at 144.
193
See id. at 159. The reciprocity of recognition is later picked up by Hegel in his
Master/slave dialectic. HEGEL, supra note 126, at 118–19.
194
See, e.g., HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 11, at 164
(discussing the leap of faith involved in communication); O’NEILL, supra note 190, at 42–
48 (discussing the second condition of judgment).
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D. The Anti-Valuative Harm of Wrongdoing
If indeed, the importance of values is a function of the interest individuals
possess in valuation, then the harm that criminal law has in mind when using
punishment to condemn wrongdoing does not concern damage done to these values
as such but rather to the ability of values to serve a valuative function.
This suggests two kinds of harms that can be targeted by criminal law: first, an
act of wrongdoing could harm its victim by denying her evaluative claims in a way
that denies her ability to create values. By rejecting the victim’s power of valuative
judgment, either by denying her access to values or by imposing on her external
considerations that prevent her from acting on her values, the wrongdoer implicitly
threatens to undermine the victim’s ability to believe in herself as a person.195
Eroding the ability of the victim to assert herself through valuation, the wrongdoer
stocks her fear of meaninglessness. As Hampton accurately notes, “[f]ear that we
are worth less than we wish (or perhaps less than others think we are worth) is a
common human phenomenon . . . . A value-denying act can, therefore, be frightening
to the victim (and others like him), insofar as it plays into those fears.”196
Second, the harm of wrongdoing can present itself in a more general and
indirect way, by diminishing the effectiveness of social values, undermining the
ability of individuals to rely on them in the course of making valuative claims.
Stealing a pen from a department store would hardly affect its owner in a way that
would diminish her ability to assert her agency, but it does undermine the efficacy
of the value of private property on which both the owner and the rest of society rely
in their valuative efforts.197 Even when a given “victim” does not perceive herself as
being negatively affected by value-denying behavior, all of society is victimized by
it, as all those who are exposed to its personhood-denying message are potentially
discouraged by it.198 As Scheffler avers:
Given that our normative and evaluative convictions serve these functions,
it is not surprising that being prevented from acting in accordance with
values one regards as authoritative, or being constrained to act in
accordance with values that one rejects, should be perceived as a grave
injury. By attacking the deliberative and motivational nexus via which our

195

See, e.g., O’NEILL, supra note 190, at 44, 133.
Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 106, at 1678; see also, CHRISTINE M.
KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 143 (1996).
197
I am indebted to Daniel Markovits, Gideon Yaffe and Roman Zinigrad for provoking
my thinking of this point, even if they might not agree with my resolution of it.
198
See, e.g., MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 76–77 (noting that the victim does not
always feel diminished by the crime); Hanna, supra note 26, at 140 (noting that criminal
behavior is wrong even when the wrongdoer does not intend to negatively affect the selfworth of the victim); Adam J. MacLeod, All for One: A Review of Victim-Centric
Justifications for Criminal Punishment, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 31, 60 (2008).
196
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values are translated into actions, these forms of interference and
constraint amount to a kind of assault on the self.199
IV. VALUATION AND CRIMINAL LAW
The valuative framework suggested above, and its corresponding conception of
wrongdoing, can help us better understand the expressivist claim that punishment is
justified as a conventional device for the promotion of social values.200
From a valuative perspective, we can distinguish between three functions
served by criminal law in support of valuation: (i) establishing a shared depository
of values; (ii) instructing individuals, through criminalization, on the breadth of
these values; and (iii) countering the adverse effects of wrongdoing through
punishment.201 The justification of punishment primarily refers to the last function.
On the valuative approach suggested here, when an individual acts in a way that
impairs the ability of others to assert their personhood, the state is tasked with
responding in a way that reaffirms the ability of others to assert their personhood.
The main difference between this approach and the value-minded expressive
justification is the realization that not all values are worthy of protection, but rather
only those that support valuation, and only to the degree that they do so.
A. Pronouncing Communal Values
For the valuative expressive account, law is concerned with, among other
things, the proclamation of the community’s values, those objects which are
collectively regarded as valuable.202 This does not imply that the state, as a collective
of individuals, is capable of the kind of valuation discussed here; instead, the state
acts as an aggregate of values, amassing the individual valuations that comprise it.203
199

SCHEFFLER, supra note 164, at 312, 315, 326.
See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400; Kahan, supra note 3, at 596.
201
For similar discussions of the purposes of law, see, for example, JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF
LAW AND DEMOCRACY 450–51 (William Rehg trans., 1996), and SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY
175–76 (2011).
202
See, e.g., BILL WRINGE, AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 62–64 (Thom
Brooks ed., 2016) (describing law as a communication of the commitments of the citizenry
to itself); Richard K. Greenstein, Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Values, 8 WASH. U.
JURIS. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015) (suggesting a broad definition of communal values); Mark Tushnet
& Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 74–
76 (1997) (describing various ways in which law relates to communal values); see generally
MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (2008) (addressing an
individual’s moral obligation to follow the law).
203
See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY
IN THE GLOBAL ERA ix (2002) (opposing the thought of cultures as discrete wholes);
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 97, at 1514–20 (arguing for the possibility of collective
agency).
200
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The legal affirmation of values assures individuals that they can communicate their
values not only amongst themselves but also on a larger scale, encompassing the
entire community—or at least large parts of it. Law, in this sense, is a catalog of
those objects toward which the state’s citizenry currently holds a valuative
disposition. This catalog usually contains general values, such as those of bodily
integrity, private property, and the family, in addition to values that are specific to
the community and its institutions, including those of particular traditions, state
symbols, and common conceptions of the good life.204
By articulating the community’s catalog of values, law does more than just
demonstrate the feasibility of successful communication. In making publicly known
those values upon which members of the community institutionally agree, law can
help minimize breakdowns in communication, and enable people to transcend
valuative disagreements by placing them within a broader context of agreement on
valuation.205 People can, for example, disagree on the particular ways in which
private property is allocated or about the extent to which bodily integrity is
protected, but the law can help them better realize that they ultimately share the same
fundamental form of valuation despite their different interpretations of it. By
creating a clear border between one individual’s possessions and another’s, or by
protecting one’s body from external transgressions, law declares that private
property and one’s body are objects to which individuals in the community
commonly attach considerable value. While some people in the community may be
radical libertarians and others socialists, law frames their disagreement so that they
understand each other as agreeing on the fundamental assignment of value to
property.
As the conditions of judgment instruct, if law is to serve its valuative function,
it must be understood as an example of creative valuation and communication, and
not as a statement of fidelity to the inherent importance of the values themselves.206
Consequently, the enactment of values cannot exclude parts of the community from
participating in the ongoing creation of the enacted values.207 Exclusionary values,
tainted by racism, sexism, or other forms of bigotry, cannot be coherently included
in the catalog of values acknowledged by the state.208 Likewise, values that have
entered the legal inventory in ways that do not reflect free valuation or have been
admitted into it without the possibility of ouster cannot be considered legitimate
parts of it.209
204
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B. Criminalization
If law, in general, aids individuals by presenting them with commonly shared
values, the valuative theory suggests that criminalization provides them with
specific instruction on how various forms of behavior will either be taken to be in
line with the value assigned to the specific object or as a sign of the actor’s denial of
the value assigned to it. In this way, law advises individuals that promising others
payment for their property is commonly viewed as respectful of their valuation of
private property while threatening to otherwise destroy it denies it.
Criminalization, in this sense, is a guidebook for proper valuative
communication, for even one who genuinely intends to recognize the other’s
valuative capacities might err in doing so without guidance on shared conventions.
As Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes suggest,
[e]xpressive theories of action tell us to express certain attitudes
adequately. The standard of adequacy is not met simply by intending to
express those attitudes, or by thinking that one’s actions do express those
attitudes. Rather, the standard of adequacy is public, set by objective
criteria for determining the meanings of action.210
Whether criminal law is aimed at the “bad man,” as Oliver Wendell Holmes
maintained,211 or aimed at the “‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is willing to
do what is required, if only he can be told what it is,” as H.L.A. Hart replied,212
criminal law, according to the valuative account, specifies the ways in which
reasonable people in a given society usually interpret external expressions as
indications of the actor’s disposition toward valuation. Even without the threat of
punishment, prohibition is a warning sign that certain actions will be perceived as
denials of the possibility of valuation, potentially undermining the ability of others
to assert their personhood.213
Law not only directs people on how their interactions with others will be
understood, but also on how and whether others will be negatively affected by the
more general flouting of communal values.214 Law can, for instance, prohibit
expressions of racism, pornography, or cruelty toward animals, even when they are
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not part of direct interpersonal interaction with another individual;215 for the
valuative account, this can be justified in light of the indirect harm of such actions.216
In discussing this idea, Cass Sunstein notes the clearly expressive motivation
behind the proposal to ban flag burning.217 Any such ban, Sunstein notes, is clearly
not aimed at eliminating the threat of flag burning itself or its immediate effect but
is meant to clarify that burning the national flag would be obnoxious to the majority
of members in the community.218 Once we understand criminalization as interested
in valuation and not in values as such, it becomes apparent that such grounds for
prohibition risk conflating the two. In guiding individuals on how they ought to
respect society’s values, criminal law cannot go as far as reifying these values
themselves, for doing so would only defeat their valuative purpose. An act of flag
burning can have various meanings. To burn a national flag in protest of that nation’s
disrespect of individuals might be offensive to the members of that nation but it is,
in fact, an affirmation of the importance of valuative personhood. To ban such
protests is to overlook that the flag’s value derives only from the support it lends to
the ability of all individuals to assert themselves.219 Burning the flag to protest the
mistreatment of minorities is an affirmation of this conception of the flag, an
expression of disappointment with the particular flag’s failure to fulfill its
purpose.220 The meaning of the act would be different, for instance, with regard to
burning a gay pride flag, when the act is meant not as a protest against mistreatment
(say of certain members within the LGBTQ community) but as a protest against
equality and inclusion. To ban the burning of a gay pride flag is to signal that people
will generally see the act not as an internal argument within the confines of
valuation, but as a denial of the ability of certain individuals to express their
personhood.221
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Context is of utmost importance here, and the criminal law must tread lightly if
it is to refrain from stifling communication rather than encouraging it.222 Conflict
and disagreement are almost inherent to valuation, and certainly do not express, in
themselves, its denial. As the conditions of judgment dictate, to make a valuative
claim is to open oneself up to the possibility of rebuff, and ruling out all possibility
of denial would only diminish the payoff of successful communication.223 Behavior
that denies another’s valuative capacities might cause her great anxiety, but, as such,
it is no different from the fundamental crisis of meaning that prompts her to assert
her personhood to begin with.224 Rather than contradict itself by seeking to eliminate
any form of existential anxiety, criminal prohibition must be limited to those
instances in which one individual interferes with another’s attempt at valuative selfassertion, thereby denying her this route of dealing with this anxiety.225
C. Punishment
Criminal law, as we have seen, can aid individuals in asserting their personhood
via valuative communication by presenting them with a shared vocabulary of values
and by supplying them with guidelines that can help them interpret the actions of
others and predict how their own actions are likely to be interpreted.226 Despite this
support, there will always be those who choose to reject the conditions of judgment
and act in ways that disrupt the ability of others to valuatively assert their
personhood: by treating them as objects, denying their power of valuation, or by
undermining the values they subscribe to.227 Being treated in such ways or observing
such behavior toward others diminishes the ability of individuals to believe that there
is truth to their belief in communicability, presenting them with what appears to be
evidence that human beings are incapable of engaging one another in intersubjective
valuation.228 By inflicting punishment on the wrongdoer, the state sends out a
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resolute countermessage, intended to reassure the belief of all members of the
community in the possibility of communicability.229
Punishment, thus understood, operates by example and, as was discussed
above, it must take care not to set the wrong one.230 According to the valuative
argument, by penalizing the wrongdoer, the state signals the community’s continued
commitment to the idea of communicability, assertively suppressing the damage
done by the wrongful act. The purpose of such communication is not to convince its
recipients of the truth of personhood or on the possibility of valuation—any attempt
to do so would be futile, if not counterproductive—but only to offset the force with
which the wrongdoer imposed her nihilism on the victim and society at large.231
In order to refute the wrongdoer’s message and reaffirm the belief in values and
valuation the message conveyed by punishment must be expressed according to the
conventions that inform such expressions.232 As expressivists generally note, the
conventions prevalent in most, if not all human societies entail that such expressions
take the form of hard treatment.233 There is, however, nothing inherent in the
conventional connection between crime and punishment qua hard treatment, and
there are certainly no reasons to make use of hard treatment to express the message
of punishment when there are more efficient ways of doing so.234
229
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The valuative underpinning of punishment entails that when forcing the
wrongdoer to be part of its expressive undertaking, the state must take care not to
ignore the wrongdoer’s own claim to personhood in the process.235 This significantly
limits the availability of various forms of punishment, even if they can effectively
communicate condemnation.236 As Kahan advises, effective punishment requires a
strong fit between the use of punitive means and the message punishment aims to
convey.237 Identifying the condemnatory function of punishment can lead us in some
cases, he argues, to prefer so-called “shaming” sanctions, such as widely publicizing
the names of wrongdoers, demanding that they bear marks of their wrongdoing or
participate self-debasing or apology rituals, over the traditional hard treatment of
incarceration and fines.238 However, while shaming sanctions can indeed be more
effective means of condemnation, their effectiveness must be weighed against their
impact on the more general purpose of supporting individual self-assertion. As
James Whitman responds to Kahan, shaming punishments risk undermining the
purpose of punishment, not because the shaming means might be inappropriate, but
because they risk expressing the wrong kind of disposition toward personhood.239
“Speaking of shame sanctions as ‘condemnation,’” Whitman observes, “does not do
justice to our intuitive sense of their peculiar kind of brutality and terror.”240 Indeed,
shaming, in this context, may be an appropriate expression of condemnation, but it
risks distorting the meaning of condemnation, so it becomes synonymous with
retaliation and vengeance, connecting crime and punishment so closely that
condemnation is no longer cognizant of the more fundamental purpose of assisting
individuals in asserting their personhood.
V. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ABORTION
This Article has argued that substituting the language of values with the
language of valuation not only makes better sense of the expressive theory of
punishment but also illuminates some of the constraints on using punishment as a
means of expressing condemnation.241 In the following pages, I will briefly explore
some ways in which these limits can present themselves in the case of the possible
criminalization and punishment of abortion. In doing so, I do not intend to make
substantive arguments for or against the permissibility or appropriateness of
abortion. A large part of the debate on abortion concerns the specific meanings
assigned to the various values abortion invokes and the moral and scientific
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determinations to be made regarding the status of the fetus.242 As the subject of this
Article is the justification of punishment, this Article cannot take account of these
considerations. I do, however, believe that acknowledging the valuative function of
criminal law can help clarify the relationship between the potential criminalization
and punishment of abortion and the social values that would ostensibly justify them.
To illuminate the points in which the valuative paradigm is the most pertinent,
I will confine the issue of abortion to the way in which it was framed by the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade.243 The Court’s opinion was informed by four
factors: the moment during which the fetus becomes a person;244 the state’s interests
in regulating abortion;245 the changes in the relative weight of these interests as the
pregnancy progresses;246 and the woman’s right to privacy.247 These factors, we shall
see, are aligned with the valuative framework proposed above, suggesting the extent
to which these factors can be interpreted by those who would disagree with the way
in which they played out in the Court’s opinion.
A. Abortion and Personhood
According to the Roe v. Wade Court’s interpretation, the legal proscription of
abortion can have in mind three potential “victims”: the fetus, the woman, and the
state’s interests.248 Of these, the Court primarily dealt with the effects of abortion on
the third.249 Given the nature of the proceeding before it—a case brought by a woman
against the state’s prohibition of abortion250—it is hardly surprising that the Court
largely avoided the possible victimization of women by abortion.251 But the Court
was also reluctant to consider the fetus a potential victim of abortion—a stance
shared by the following discussion.
The Court reached this decision primarily by considering the moment at which
the claim to personhood materializes as a matter of legal convention.252 Distancing
itself from any pretense of making a scientific, moral, or philosophical statement of
fact, the Court surveyed the ways in which the term “person” was used by common
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law, concluding that it was not commonly understood to include the unborn.253
Although I see no reason to diverge from this conclusion, I want to remark on how
the question might be treated by the valuative theory.
Under the valuative approach, respect for an agent’s personhood is mandated
by her ability to mirror and validate another’s claim to personhood.254 To deserve
such respect, an agent does not necessarily have to be capable of actual verbal
communication; the question is whether others can envision her as capable of doing
so.255 The validity of one’s valuative judgments is a matter of communicability, not
of communication. To be able to believe that she is capable of assigning value and
communicate it to others, the individual needs only to be able to believe that others
would acknowledge her ability to do so, not that others actually do so. Accordingly,
the respect individuals are due are as potential agents, which could be perceived by
others as capable of communication. A potential partner for communication could,
therefore, be unavailable—she could be far away, asleep, or unconscious—but she
could also be incapable of actual communication, being an infant, mentally
impaired, an unborn fetus, or even an animal.256 The question of who or what is
potentially a person concerns the limits of valuative imagination and is a matter of
social conventions.257
Nevertheless, I believe that a persuasive case can be made in favor of viewing
the moment after birth, in which we meet the eyes of another human being as the
moment in which we begin to perceive them as potential partners in communication.
As Sartre notes, it is in the imagined gaze of another that we are constantly made
aware of the possibility of our own personhood.258 Although we can bear with us the
253
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thought of another’s gaze even though we have never set eyes upon them nor they
on us, there is, as Levinas noted, something remarkable about the encounter with
another’s visage, “in the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the
Other.”259 In this sense, the Court’s ruling that an unborn fetus is not a rights-baring
person is a matter of legal convention, but it is not one that could be easily altered.
A child minutes after birth barely has more capacity for agency than a fetus moments
prior to it.260 By the same token, it takes quite some time after birth for a child to
actually develop the qualities that are commonly associated with agency. What
changes in birth is not some physical or metaphysical quality of the fetus but the
tendency to view it as a potential partner in communication by virtue of its ability to
mirror the claims to personhood of others.
B. The Values Protected by Abortion Prohibition
When law prohibits certain behavior, it will not always be clear what values the
prohibition serves. In such cases, it is up to the court deciding on the justifiability of
the prohibition to discern which values inform the law and whether their enactment
into law conforms with the valuative purpose of the prohibition.261
The Roe v. Wade Court acknowledged three sets of values as potentially
informing the prohibition of abortion: the value of “proper” sexual conduct; the
safety of medical procedures; and potential life.262 The first of these values was
promptly rejected by the Court, as the state did not purport to justify the prohibition
by reference to it.263 The valuative theory suggests that this omission may have been
too hasty. The question of whether the state’s proclaimed intention in enacting the
prohibition necessarily determines its actual meaning exceeds the bounds of our
discussion. Still, given the conventional nature of values, it is clear that the
enactment of values into law cannot sever them from the broad cultural context that
gives them concrete meaning.264 Accordingly, the values implicitly promoted by the
prohibition of abortion—sexuality, womanhood, procreation, maternity, and the
like—can have a profound impact on how the protection of the more explicit values
is interpreted.265 Although the involvement of such implicit values does not
necessarily disqualify any prohibition that is informed by them, they can still inform
Id.
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the determination of whether the prohibition in question indeed supports the purpose
of promoting individual valuation. Values that circumscribe the creativity of women
to certain aspects of their physiology and that undermine their ability to be perceived
as full-fledged political agents, capable of shaping communal values, can only be
regarded as values in a very narrow sense, incongruent with the purpose of
valuation.266 To the extent that such “values” inform the prohibition of abortion, the
prohibition necessarily lacks justification.
Similar considerations apply to the value of bodily integrity as it informs the
regulation of medical procedures. Although there is no doubt that the integrity of
one’s body is a legitimate value, this value must be expressed in a way that does not
reflect differently with respect to men and women; specifically, such protection
cannot single out the reproductive capacities of women as a sole, or superior cause
for concern.267 Certainly, there are good reasons for the state to seek to prohibit
needlessly dangerous medical procedures, meaning procedures that can be made less
hazardous.268 The Court, however, went on to allow the prohibition of excessively
dangerous abortions, meaning those procedures in which the predicted risk to the
women’s bodily integrity from the abortion is higher than the risk posed by the
continuation of the pregnancy.269 While there is nothing inherently biased about this
degree of care for the bodily integrity of patients, no such excessive caution is taken
with regard to many other medical procedures that are riskier than the condition they
seek to eliminate, from elective surgeries to various procedures meant to promote
fertility and conception, at times involving risk to those who undergo them.270 Such
forms of partiality raise doubt as to whether the connection between the prohibition
of abortion and the general concern with physical well-being is sincere, raising the
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suspicion that the prohibition is informed by considerations that diminish rather than
strengthen the valuative claim to personhood of those involved.
The third and final value involved with the prohibition of abortion, the value of
potential life, is the value with the most evident connection to the prohibition. It
must, however, be kept in mind that in talking of the protection of potential life, we
are discussing not the protection of the fetus qua rights-bearing (potential) person,
but rather the protection of the social value assigned to biological objects that have
the potential of transforming into persons.271 This does not suggest, however, that
the value of biological life is meaningless for the valuations of people in the
community, for as we saw, values are important as media of valuation.272
“A community,” as Dworkin writes, “has an interest in protecting the sanctity
of life—in protecting the community’s sense that human life in any form has
enormous intrinsic value—by requiring its members to acknowledge that intrinsic
value in their individual decisions.”273 Dworkin, however, errs in suggesting that
there is “intrinsic” value to biological life.274 Instead, as Dworkin himself notes in
the same sentence, the value assigned to biological life represents the “community’s
sense” that a biological connection to the human race makes certain objects unique.
Even though the value assigned to biological humanity could, theoretically,
justify the prohibition of abortion, as Neil and Reva Siegel point out, there are good
reasons to suspect that this value is, in fact, that which informs the prohibition.275 As
Siegel and Siegel further note note, while many legislatures purport to anchor the
prohibition of abortion in the value of biological humanity, if that was their true
intent, it would be expected that legislatures “would bend over backwards to provide
material support for the women who are required to bear—too often alone—the
awesome physical, emotional, and financial costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and
childrearing,” which they often fail to do.276
C. Prohibiting Abortion
Despite the fact that the Texas statute at the center of the Roe v. Wade litigation
was primarily aimed against the physician performing the procedure, the Court
largely ignored the physician’s role and charted the limits of the prohibition in light
of the relation between the woman’s right to privacy and the state’s interest in
securing the values discussed above.277 For the Court, the weight assigned to the
271
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protected social values increases as the pregnancy progresses.278 As a result, the
Court ruled that protecting the value of safe medical procedures justifies the
prohibition of abortion when abortion becomes riskier than carrying the pregnancy
to term, and that the social value assigned to biological humanity justifies
prohibition once the fetus reaches the stage of viability, when the state interest in
protecting this value outweighs the woman’s right to privacy.
The appeal to privacy as the right against which the state’s interests are
measured struck the dissenting Justice Rehnquist as odd, and not without good
reason:
I have difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, that the right of
“privacy” is involved in this case. Texas, by the statute here challenged,
bars the performance of a medical abortion by a licensed physician on a
plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation such as this
is not “private” in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the “privacy”
that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from
searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to
privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). If the Court means by
the term “privacy” no more than that the claim of a person to be free from
unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions may be a form of
“liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no doubt that
similar claims have been upheld in our earlier decisions on the basis of
that liberty.279
Against this objection, the valuative theory suggests that the language of
privacy is an appeal to a substantive right but rather a proxy for the communicative
aspects of the act in question, designed to determine whether the prohibition is
logically aimed at the protection of values qua instruments of valuation. Prohibition,
the valuative theory tells us, is meant to specify the forms of behavior that are likely
to be interpreted by members of the community as a denial of their ability to form
values.280 In this sense, to deem abortion private is to view it as a non-communicative
behavior; meaning a form of behavior that is not commonly understood to take place
between two or more individuals.281 What makes the act of abortion private is not
its reproductive subject matter or its role in the decisions that shape one’s family
life, but the fact that it is not understood to convey a message.
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As the Court notes, the interpretation of the act of abortion may change as the
pregnancy progresses;282 abortion might in this sense become a public matter if its
denial of the protected value is so severe that it cannot but be seen by the community
as a denial of valuation itself. An abortion performed one minute prior to birth could,
by this token, become communicative, even though the fetus is not yet regarded as
a person, for the proximity to the moment in which the claim to personhood
materializes makes it a form of behavior that people throughout the community
cannot disregard. Deciding on the exact moment in which the act of abortion enters
the public domain is a matter of convention, evaluated in light of the principles
governing valuation.283
D. Punishing Abortion
The criminalization of abortion, the Court found, can be justifiable in view of
the message it sends, expressing support for the values of biological humanity and
medical safety.284 As the valuative theory suggests, the criminalization of actions
that harm these values is justified because, through criminalization, the law both
signals its support of valuation and instructs people on how to express similar
support.285 These purposes, however, can be promoted independently of the response
to wrongdoing.286 Although in most cases, the lack of a condemnatory response to
criminal wrongdoing would be seen as diminishing or even excoriating the state’s
expression of commitment towards the protected values, the valuative point of view
suggests that there can certainly be cases in which the connection between the
legislative declaration of support and the penal expression of condemnation is not
as immediate.
Abortion can be seen as one such case. Even though there may be good reasons
to accept certain aspects of the prohibition of abortion, particularly those concerning
its effect on the value of biological humanity during later stages of pregnancy, there
may nonetheless be reason to believe that they do not necessitate supplanting
criminalization itself with a condemnatory message. Valuation, as we have seen, is
based in part on the possibility of disagreement; insisting on condemning those who
commit controversial illegal acts risks becoming an attempt to reify values and
eliminate the possibility of disputing them. Although this does not pave the way to
disregarding the law, it makes law more appreciative of the possibility of dissent and
less condemnatory in its reply to it.
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This is particularly so, when, as is the case with abortion, condemnation would
only exacerbate an already existing difficulty with the protected values.287 As Siegel
suggests, even if we accept, for the sake of argument, the legitimacy of prohibiting
abortion, we cannot disregard the troubling side effects it involves:
(1) whatever the asserted fetal-protective rationale, in actual practice legal
restrictions on abortion have reflected and entrenched customary, genderdifferentiated norms concerning sexual expression and parenting; (2) they
have conscripted the lives of poor and vulnerable women without similarly
constraining the privileged; (3) they have punished women for sexual
activity without holding men commensurately responsible; and (4) they
have used law to coerce, but not to support, women in childbearing.288
Despite the importance of the values the prohibition of abortion is intended to
express, the condemnation of the act of abortion cannot be considered apart from the
profound—and at times life-changing—implications that performing, or not
performing it carry with them.289 Even when we can attribute to this act, the
wrongness associated with flouting the community’s values, we cannot disregard
the fact that heeding these values involves an immense incursion into the lives of
individuals, particularly of women, and that the prohibition is often unaccompanied
by meaningful provisions that might offset the price it extracts.290 While these
considerations might fall short of upending the justifiability of the prohibition, they
carry much more weight when justifying the condemnatory response. Given the
alternative ways in which the value of biological humanity might be affirmed,
particularly those that would obviate the need for abortion, such as contraceptives
and sexual education, a policy that ignores the latter while focusing on condemnation
seems to betray the kind of dishonesty that can undermine the state’s expression of
allegiance to valuation.
CONCLUSION
The valuative theory of punishment tells us that punishment is justified for its
contribution to the general legal purpose of assisting individuals in their valuative
self-assurance. The individual, the theory argues, is driven by an existential interest
in believing that she is a person: enduring, creative, and distinct from the world. To
promote this interest, the individual, among other things, seeks to endow
inconsequential objects with meaning and communicate this meaning to others so
that they can affirm her claim to personhood by acknowledging her valuative claim.
Law, this Article argues, promotes this interest in three main ways: by creating an
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inventory of agreed-upon values; by providing hermeneutic guidelines for the
interpretation of the relation of various forms of behavior to these values; and by
sending a counter-message to offset the effects of those forms of behavior that set
back the interest in self-assurance.291
As this Article illustrated, this theory does not contend that there is some
inherent importance to the values it supports, nor that there is some necessary
connection between crime and punishment. Punishment, this Article argues, is a
response to crime, but there is nothing unique or obligatory about this response. The
state contributes in various ways to the valuative interest, and punishment is one of
them. That punishment serves to express condemnation of wrongdoing is essential
to punishment’s understanding. However, condemnation itself is only a
conventional response, which, like the other conventional components of criminal
law, is merely an instrument in the service of the conviction that human beings are
persons.
The key to understanding this idea lies with its ironical stance, taking the
conventions and convictions it deals with with a grain of salt without disparaging
them.292 The irony of the valuative approach is the recognition that the meaning we
assign to the things we hold dear—even to our own personhood—is of our own
making. This does not mean that such things are any less meaningful, only that we
must find the source of their meaningfulness in our interest in valuing those things
we care about, injecting the argument with a healthy dose of modesty and
moderation.293 As Thomas Nagel pointedly articulates,
philosophical skepticism does not cause us to abandon our ordinary
beliefs, but it lends them a peculiar flavor. After acknowledging that their
truth is incompatible with possibilities that we have no grounds for
believing do not obtain – apart from grounds in those very beliefs which
we have called into question – we return to our familiar convictions with
a certain irony and resignation.294
The irony of the valuative approach does not mean that it is relativistic in its
promotion of values or flippant in employing punishment against those who
undermine the interest in valuation. The evil of criminal wrongdoing, it tells us, is
concrete; but it is also ultimately a matter of perception, not of essence. Correcting
the damage done by wrongdoing is not in any way unique to punishment. As long
as punishment is genuinely aimed at the affirmation of valuation, it needs no further
justification. However, we must also consider whether, in any given case, it is the
most appropriate and effective way of reaffirming the meaning assigned to the
flouted values.295
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These insights have an immediate bearing on the potential criminalization of
abortion. Once we construct the question, as the Roe Court did, as one that concerns
the potential harm the act of abortion might cause to protected social values, we must
treat it differently than we would actions that threaten to undermine the valuative
efforts of others directly. This does not rule out the legitimate prohibition of
abortion, for its negative effect on social values might indirectly affect others; but
we must be cautious not to think it wrongful for its flouting of values simpliciter.
Accordingly, when we come to assess whether, in any given case, the prohibition of
abortion is justified, we must first of all inquire whether it is genuinely aimed at the
support of the individual faculty of valuation, or whether it sacrifices the individuals
involved in the name of fantastic values that are divorced from their human creators.

